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 ABSTRACT 
Financial Asset Accumulation by Poor Adolescents Participating in Child Savings 
Accounts in Low Resource Communities in Uganda 
Leyla Karimli 
 
This dissertation examined savings attitudes and financial asset accumulation of poor and 
vulnerable school-going AIDS-orphaned adolescents involved in a subsidized matched child savings 
program in Uganda and being cared for by a living parent (adolescents who have lost one parent) or 
by an adult guardian within an extended family (for adolescents who have lost both parents). More 
specifically, the study tested (1) whether participation in a subsidized matched savings program had 
an independent effect above and beyond the effect of individual and family characteristics on 
adolescents' saving attitudes and self-reported financial asset accumulation; (2) whether family 
characteristics (i.e. family relations, family financial socialization, and household demographics) 
moderated the effect of participation in a subsidized matched child savings program on adolescents' 
saving attitudes and self-reported financial asset accumulation; and (3) whether the adolescents’ 
future orientation and family financial socialization served as mechanisms to transmit the effect of 
the participation in a subsidized matched child savings program on adolescents' self-reported 
financial asset accumulation. Grounded in an integrated theoretical framework of classical and 
behavioral economics, family financial socialization theory, and the institutional theory of saving, 
this study used longitudinal analyses of data on 346 dyads (adolescents and their guardians) collected 
in a experimental cluster-randomized controlled trial. The study found that adolescents’ saving 
attitudes (both reported willingness to save and reported confidence in saving), although not 
affected by participation in a subsidized matched child savings program, were significantly associated 
with family relations, family financial socialization, caregiver’s gender, and adolescent’s gender and 
 educational aspirations. Adolescents’ self-reported saving was significantly affected by participation 
in a subsidized matched child savings program; this effect was direct, and neither moderated nor 
mediated by any of the family characteristics, nor by adolescent’s future orientation. The 
adolescents’ self-reported amount saved is significantly affected by participation in a subsidized 
matched child savings program. This effect is weakened by the number of children in the household: 
the more children in the household, the weaker the effect. In addition, the effect is potentially 
mediated by the guardian saving for the adolescent. The findings contribute to the institutional 
perspective on saving arguing that saving is not only a function of individual characteristics, but also 
institutional opportunities. Findings may help inform programs and policies facilitating asset-
building initiatives for youth in developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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CHAPTER 1: RATIONALE 
 
1.1. Adolescent poverty in sub-Saharan Africa 
Today, about 1.2 billion people, that is 18% of world’s population, are adolescents aged 10-
191; and 17% of them live in sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region in the world. Almost every 
fourth person in sub-Saharan Africa is an adolescent aged 10-19 (UN Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs, 2011; UNICEF, 2012), and every second person in the region lives below the 
international poverty line of US$1.25 (Fosu, 2009; UN, 2013). 
The international poverty line, although widely used to measure economic poverty, does not 
fully reflect the complexity of poverty, which is a multidimensional phenomenon experienced not 
only in terms of material deprivation but also as a lack of access to education and health, exposure to 
vulnerability and risk, and powerlessness (Hulme, Moore, & Shepherd, 2011; World Bank, 2000). To 
illustrate adolescent poverty in sub-Saharan Africa: 38% of adolescents in sub-Saharan Africa are out 
of school (compared to 20% globally). Every third illiterate young person lives in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Nearly one in every four adolescent girls in the region faces negative consequences of early 
marriage, including school dropout, domestic violence, early childbearing, and HIV. 
Specific to the HIV/AIDS, a global public health crisis, adolescents in sub-Saharan Africa 
have been one of the hardest hit groups. Out of all HIV-positive adolescents aged 10-19, 82% (1.2 
million) live in sub-Saharan Africa (UNICEF, 2011, 2012). Today, more than 15 million children in 
the region have lost a parent to AIDS, and half of the these orphans are aged 10-14 (UNICEF, 
2006, 2013) . This specific sub-group of adolescents, compared to their non-orphaned counterparts, 
are more likely to be out of school, perform poorly at school, and have higher rates of conduct 
                                                 
1 In this dissertation, I adopt the WHO definition of adolescence as the period between ages 10 and 
19 years (WHO, 2001). Details on definition of adolescence are provided in a later sub-section 1.3.  
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problems and delinquency, and depression (Beegle, De Weerdt, & Dercon, 2009; Pequegnat, Bell, & 
Allison, 2012; UNICEF, 2006). 
Several theoretical frameworks within different social science disciplines attempt to explain 
causes of poverty and propose several approaches to addressing poverty, including individual level-
targeted approaches (family, and household), and community-level or structural approaches. Several 
approaches also focus on different dimensions of poverty, such as, income, employment, nutrition, 
health, education, and housing (Banerjee, Benabou, & Mookherjee, 2006; Barrientos, 2011; Blank, 
2003; Bradshaw, 2007; Hulme et al., 2011; Sen, 2006; Stark, 2009; Vu, 2010). Increasingly, however, 
anti-poverty interventions integrate multiple approaches and, concurrently, target several dimensions 
(Aber & Rawlings, 2011; Barrientos, 2011; Ssewamala, Sperber, Zimmerman, & Karimli, 2010). An 
example of this integrated anti-poverty approach is the use of economic incentives, including 
subsidized matched savings programs, to support modest accumulation of financial assets by the 
poor, while concurrently addressing non-economic dimensions of poverty—improving educational 
outcomes (e.g., enrollment, attendance, and performance), enhancing health and psychological well-
being, assisting with homeownership, and increasing social capital. This dissertation examines an 
economic incentive approach that uses subsidized matched savings accounts for adolescents (also 
known as Child Savings Accounts) with the purpose of families accumulating financial assets for 
adolescents’ well-being. Specifically, the focus is on Child Savings Accounts opened for orphaned 
school-going adolescents living in poor households and communities heavily affected by HIV/AIDS 
in southern Uganda. 
 
1.2. An asset-based approach to addressing adolescent poverty 
Reducing poverty by assisting poor households accumulate assets is a core argument of an 
asset-based approach, which views poverty as a function of limited capabilities of individuals to 
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attain what they have reason to value (Sen, 1999, 2006). In this context, assets—broadly defined as 
stock of inputs (financial, human, physical, or social) that produce positive returns (Nam, Huang, & 
Sherraden, 2008; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007)—are seen as tools to help individuals and 
households advance economically, socially, and psychologically, beyond merely satisfying their 
consumption needs (Robeyns, 2005; Schischka, Dalziel, & Saunders, 2008; Sherraden, 1991). 
An asset-based approach does not deny importance of income in enhancing individual 
capabilities, but argues that assets promote well-being through mechanisms distinct and more 
powerful than income alone (Cramer, Sherraden, & McKernan, 2008). Thus, asset-based approaches 
address not only economic dimension of poverty, but also psycho-social factors affected by and 
related to poverty. The process of asset accumulation as well as ownership of assets may change 
people’s attitudes and behaviors, leading to higher self-esteem, greater feeling of control over their 
lives, and greater future orientation, and, thus, facilitating their exit from poverty (Lerman & 
McKernan, 2008; Loibl, Grinstein-Weiss, Zhan, & Red Bird, 2010; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; 
Ssewamala, Han, & Neilands, 2009; Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 2009)  
Subsidized Child Savings Accounts, the focus of this dissertation, are part of an asset-
accumulation approach for low-income adolescents. Studies have shown that adults who had savings 
accounts as adolescents are more likely to have accounts and save (Beutler & Dickson, 2008; Elliott, 
Webley, & Friedline, 2011; Webley & Nyhus, 2006). Moreover, asset accumulation in subsidized 
matched savings programs for adolescents—similar to its effects on adults—is associated with 
several health-related outcomes, including reduced depression levels, higher self-esteem, reduced 
sexual risk-taking intentions, and positive educational-related outcomes, including higher educational 
aspirations, and better academic performance (Han, Ssewamala, & Wang, 2013; Scanlon & Adams, 
2009; Ssewamala et al., 2009; Ssewamala, Han, Neilands, Ismayilova, & Sperber, 2010; Ssewamala & 
Ismayilova, 2009; Ssewamala, Neilands, Waldfogel, & Ismayilova, 2012).  
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1.3. Can poor adolescents accumulate assets: what we know 
A main policy question in asset-based approach to poverty reduction is whether poor people 
accumulate assets. To answer this question, Sherraden (1991) proposed an institutional theory of 
saving in which he argued that poor people can accumulate assets (for example, in the form of 
financial savings) if supported by institutionalized mechanisms such as incentives and subsidies 
(Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007; Sherraden, 1990, 1991; Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 2003). The 
theory was tested through a large-scale multi-year study called American Dream Demonstration 
(ADD) implemented in 1997-2002 among 2,377 low-income participants. Evidence from ADD 
showed that poor people can and do accumulate financial assets if provided with institutional 
structures, including access to financial institutions, facilitation, and incentives in the form of 
matched savings (Curley, 2004; Curley, Ssewamala, & Sherraden, 2009; Grinstein-Weiss, Wagner, & 
Ssewamala, 2006; Han, Grinstein-Weiss, & Sherraden, 2009; Sherraden et al., 2003; Ssewamala, 2003; 
Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004). 
As informative as evidence from ADD was, it mostly pertains to low-income families in 
western industrialized countries, specifically the United States. Although subsidized matched savings 
programs are beginning to emerge in sub-Saharan Africa (i.e., Suubi programs implemented in 
Uganda and evaluated by Ssewamala and colleagues), little is known about asset accumulation in 
these emerging programs. Significant differences between socio-economic settings and profiles of 
poor people in sub-Saharan Africa and western industrialized countries warn against extrapolating 
the U.S.-based evidence to sub-Saharan Africa. 
Furthermore, the evidence base specific for adolescents is very limited. Generally, definition 
of adolescence characterized in terms of age and biological changes (i.e., puberty, cognitive 
development) as well as social-role transformations (i.e. completing education, employment, 
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marriage, parenthood) varies across societies (Sawyer et al., 2012). American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry partitions adolescence into early adolescence (11-13 years), middle 
adolescence (14-18 years), and late adolescence (19-24 years) (American Academy of Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatry, 2013). National Adolescent Health Policy of Uganda defines adolescents as 
individuals from age 10 to age 19 years (Ministry of Health, 2004).  
For this dissertation study, I use the World Health Organization’s definition of 
adolescence—defining adolescence as a period between ages 10 and 19 years (WHO, 2001). Despite 
variations in definitions, there is an overall agreement that adolescence is a distinct and important 
period of life that shapes future life trajectories (Catalano et al., 2012; Sawyer et al., 2012). 
Amidst the general dearth of information on adolescents (UNICEF, 2011, 2012), little is 
known about financial asset accumulation by adolescents in matched savings programs. Most of the 
studies on accumulation of financial assets by adolescents focus on their economic socialization, 
mainly by parents and peers. These studies argue that adolescents adopt their parent’s financial 
behavior and attitudes through financial socialization, defined as the process of “acquiring and 
developing values, attitudes, standards, norms, knowledge and behaviors that contribute to the 
financial viability and individual well-being” (Danes, 1994, p. 128). Very few studies address 
specifically asset accumulation by adolescents themselves, or the relationship between asset 
accumulation and adolescents’ attitudes towards saving—the latter defined as an adolescents’ 
inclination to respond favorably or unfavorably to accumulating financial assets in the form of 
savings (Ajzen, 1989; Xiao, 2008).  
As mentioned earlier, adolescence is a sensitive time for social learning. It is also a time when 
patterns of behavior are being established, potentially forming a basis for future trajectories. 
Specifically, saving preferences and habits developed during adolescence shape financial behavior 
during adulthood. In other words, people who save in adolescence are more likely to save in 
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adulthood (Ashby, Schoon, & Webley, 2011; Friedline, Elliott, & Nam, 2011). Therefore, 
understanding factors that shape adolescents’ saving behavior and attitudes may potentially have 
long-term implications for inter-generational mobility out of poverty. 
Furthermore, adolescents constitute a demographic dividend (i.e. macroeconomic 
opportunity related to a growing cohort of working-age adults relative to the dependent population) 
yet to be realized. Yet, poverty impedes this realization and may turn a potential dividend into an 
economic and social burden (Ssewamala, 2012; UNFPA, 2010). When lacking opportunities to 
improve their lives, adolescents face challenges related to early marriage, high HIV incidence rates, 
early pregnancy, and low-wage and informal employment. It is, therefore, vital to understand how 
different approaches—including the use of subsidized matched savings accounts—may affect low-
income adolescents. Additionally, in order to design evidence-based policies that facilitate asset-
accumulation by poor adolescents in sub-Saharan Africa, context-specific (i.e. region-specific and 
population-specific) knowledge is vital. 
Finally, as indicated earlier, asset accumulation and ownership of assets may lead to greater 
future orientation, defined as “one’s ability to think about the plan for the future” (p. 111, Shobe & 
Page-Adams, 2001). This argument—theoretisized within the institutional theory of saving—has not 
been extensively tested, specifically in relation to asset accumulation by adolescents. Furthermore, 
future orientation is not only a possible outcome of asset ownership but also a possible predictor of 
asset accumulation, including saving (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'donoghue, 2002; Jacobs-Lawson 
& Hershey, 2005; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). It is, therefore, possible that future orientation 
serves as a pathway through which matched savings programs affect asset accumulation. Specific 
mechanisms that transmit the effect of matched savings programs on accumulation of financial 
assets by adolescents are yet to be articulated. 
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This dissertation addresses the existing gap in region-specific and population-specific 
knowledge in regards to financial asset accumulation by adolescents, and examines savings attitudes 
and financial asset accumulation of poor and vulnerable AIDS-orphaned adolescents involved in a 
matched child savings program in Uganda. I examine different pathways, incorporating individual, 
family, and institutional characteristics in order to understand which of these constructs contribute 
to any observed changes in saving attitudes and accumulation of financial assets for poor orphaned 
adolescents in a subsidized matched savings program. More importantly, I test the intervention effect of 
participation in the subsidized matched savings accounts program on savings attitudes and financial 
asset accumulation of poor and vulnerable AIDS-orphaned adolescents involved in a matched child 
savings program. I use a longitudinal 3-year data set collected from both adolescents and their 
primary caregivers through a cluster-randomized controlled trial intervention. The longitudinal 
nature of the dataset used allows one to conduct rigorous analyses and to generate robust evidence-
based information on a rarely studied population:  poor and vulnerable AIDS-orphaned adolescents 
involved in a matched child savings program in a poor developing country—Uganda.  The robust 
findings may further inform the development of asset-based approaches and policies to addressing 
poverty, specifically among orphaned and vulnerable adolescents in poor resource settings. 
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CHAPTER 2: INTEGRATED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTANDING 
HOW PEOPLE SAVE AND WHY THEY DO NOT SAVE 
Three major theoretical frameworks—Life-Cycle and Behavioral Life-Cycle theory, Family 
Financial Socialization approach, and Institutional Theory of Saving—investigate the question of 
how people save and why they do not save, putting different emphases on individual, family, and 
institutional characteristics that account for people’s saving behavior and saving attitudes. 
 
2.1. Individual characteristics 
Individual characteristics potentially affecting a person’s saving attitudes and behavior 
include individual’s age, gender, time preferences, personal motives, expectations, and future 
orientation. Classical and behavioral economists tend to place an individual’s saving behavior within 
the framework of intertemporal choice between spending today and saving in order to spend in the 
future. Given this orientation, classical and behavioral economists have extensively examined the 
contribution of individual characteristics, in this case, age, gender, and time preferences in informing 
a person’s utility from saving. Within this framework, individuals are believed to have fixed and 
known preferences that inform their intertemporal choice with the aim of optimizing their utility. 
The most prominent theory in classical economics, studying how people save and why they 
do not save, is the Life-Cycle Theory of saving (Ando & Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani, 1986, 2005). 
The theory posits that at any given age, a person choses between consumption and saving based on 
resources available to her over the life-time (as opposed to the decision being based solely on 
current income). The utility function of any person is a function of her aggregate consumption in 
current and future periods and the main saving motive is to optimize this utility, that is, to smooth 
consumption in face of income fluctuations over the life time. Savings increase when current income 
rises above the expected lifetime resources and decrease when current income falls below the 
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expected lifetime resources. Additionally, an individual’s current consumption is a function of her 
life-time resources and the rate of return on these resources, with parameters depending on age. 
Consequently, variation in savings among individuals is an inverted U-shaped function of age with 
young and elderly individuals having fewer savings than middle-age individuals. 
The main critique of the Life-Cycle Theory of saving targets its underlying assumption that 
people are rational decision-makers with rational consistent intertemporal plans. In reality, however, 
people may not be able to optimize their utility for several reasons. For example, determining the 
saving rate that optimizes utility is difficult. Solving intertemporal optimization problems requires 
incorporating uncertainty about the future earnings. It may be a daunting task and few individuals 
would be able to perform sophisticated calculations required for this (Deaton, 2005; Winter, 
Schlafmann, & Rodepeter, 2012). Saving can also be challenged by behavioral factors, such as, for 
example, loss aversion and hyperbolic discounting. Loss aversion refers to the tendency of weighing 
loses significantly more heavily than gains. Once people get used to a particular level of disposable 
income, they may be reluctant to save because savings may reduce disposable income, and this 
reduction is seen as a loss (Fisher & Montalto, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Hyperbolic 
discounting refers to time-inconsistent intertemporal choices: people tend to weight current and 
near-current consumption more heavily than future consumption, thus, discounting future rewards 
relative to immediate gratification. In a choice between two rewards, a small one in the current or 
near-current time (t) and a large one at the future time (t+1), the closer the time t to zero, the higher 
the perceived cost of waiting relative to the differences in values of rewards. Consequently, people 
decide to choose a small reward in current or near-current time (Maital & Maital, 1994; Thaler, 1981; 
Thaler & Benartzi, 2004). 
In response to critique of Life-Cycle Theory of saving Shefrin & Thaler suggested the 
Behavioral Life-Cycle hypotheses incorporating three main behavioral factors: (1) self-control; (2) 
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mental accounting; and (3) framing (Shefrin & Thaler, 1988). Self-control refers to the assumption 
that individuals have two mutually exclusive tendencies: myopic (concerned only with current 
consumption) and rational (concerned with maximizing the life-time utility). Self-control keeps the 
myopic side on a leash and helps individuals make optimal choices. To achieve self-control, one may 
need will-power and/or prescriptive saving tools, such as automatic enrollment in saving plans or 
direct deposits to their accounts. Mental accounting and framing refer to the proposition that 
individuals’ saving choices are affected by how individuals frame or describe their wealth. 
Individuals divide their wealth into separate mental accounts, such as current income, current assets, 
and future income; and choice between spending and saving depends on how the particular fraction 
of wealth is framed. People are more tempted to spend from the “current income” account, and 
least tempted to spend from the “future income” account. 
In conjunction with economic theories described above, psychologists examined the effects 
of different psychological variables—such as motives and expectations (Canova, Rattazzi, & Webley, 
2005; Fisher & Montalto, 2010), attitudes (Furnham, 1985; Pirinsky, 2013) and future orientation 
(Anong & Fisher, 2013; Puri & Robinson, 2007)—on people’s saving behavior. Studies show that 
different psychological mechanisms induce different saving behaviors (Fisher & Montalto, 2010; 
Katona, 1977, 2001; Nyhus & Webley, 2001; van Veldhoven & Groenland, 1993). For example, 
people who save for short period of time will have different motives, time preferences, and attitudes 
towards delaying gratification, compared to people who save for longer period of time. Similarly, 
people who save by putting money into bank accounts will have different level of confidence, 
optimism and attitudes towards risk, compared to people who save through mortgage, investment or 
mutual funds. Future orientation, referring to person’s outlook towards the future, may alter 
person’s evaluation of economic situation and/or shape person’s time preferences,  thus affecting 
the choice between spending and saving (Jacobs-Lawson & Hershey, 2005; Puri & Robinson, 2007). 
11 
Gender and age are found to be significant predictors of saving motives, attitudes and future 
orientation, thus affecting saving behavior (Anong & Fisher, 2013; DeVaney, Anong, & Whirl, 
2007). 
 
2.2. Family characteristics 
Family factors potentially affecting individuals’ saving attitudes and behavior comprise 
household characteristics (e.g., household size, number of earners in the household, presence of 
children), interpersonal family relations, and financial socialization within the family. 
Some studies in economics and sociology (Bauer & Auer-Srnka, 2012; Du & Kamakura, 
2006; Lawson, 1988; Putler, Li, & Liu, 2007; Wells & Gubar, 1966) examine individuals’ saving 
applying a family life-cycle, defined by household’s demographic profiles. To measure a family life-
cycle, authors use different variations of household size, marital status, age and employment status 
of household head, number of adults, and presence of children of different ages. The main challenge 
in applying the family life-cycle approach to the study of saving behavior is general disagreement 
among scholars on how to define specific life-cycle categories. 
The household demographics—such as age and gender of the head of household, number of 
people in the household, and presence of extended family—as predictors of an individual’s saving 
are also examined outside of the family life-cycle concept (Banerjee & Duflo, 2007; Browning & 
Lusardi, 1996; Di Falco & Bulte, 2011; Donni & Chiappori, 2011; Horioka, 2010). There is some 
evidence that the presence of young children, particularly in single parent households, may have a 
negative effect on an individual’s saving behavior. Claims from extended family members may also 
reduce the cash available at home.  
Another framework for studying the family effect on an individual’s saving attitudes and 
behavior is the family financial socialization approach (Danes, 1994; Gudmunson & Danes, 2011; 
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Jorgensen & Savla, 2010; J. Kim, LaTaillade, & Kim, 2011). This approach (the family financial 
socialization) suggests that people’s financial behavior and attitudes are affected by their family’s 
financial socialization, defined as a process of “acquiring and developing values, attitudes, standards, 
norms, knowledge and behaviors that contributes to the financial viability and individual well-being” 
(Danes, 1994, p. 128). The key premise of family financial socialization theory is that most financial 
socialization results from day-to-day family interaction and implicit financial training within the 
family (Jorgensen & Savla, 2010). Financial learning in the family may occur in three ways: (a) 
conscious or unconscious communication of norms and expectations resulting from observations or 
imitation of behaviors; (b) family members’ positive and negative reinforcement; and (c) overt 
communication (Moschis, 1985). In fact, most of the financial socialization within the family 
happens through implicit processes, rather than explicit financial training. 
Family financial socialization, as an explanatory framework, has been extensively applied to 
the study of saving attitudes and behavior of young people, including children and adolescents 
(Furnham, 1999a; C. Kim, Lee, & Tomiuk, 2009; Otto, 2013; Shim, Barber, Card, Xiao, & Serido, 
2010; Webley & Nyhus, 2006, 2013). Children and adolescents’ financial behavior, including 
consumption patterns and expectations and beliefs related to savings, are believed to be heavily 
influenced by their family members, particularly their parents (Gudmunson & Danes, 2011). As 
suggested by social learning theory (Bandura, 2001), children and adolescents learn financial 
behaviors by observing and modeling those of their parents and caregivers; they also learn from 
parents’ intentional or unintentional teaching. For example, adolescents whose parents are more 
prudent in spending money (e.g., saving, living within income, paying bills on time) are more 
successful in avoiding credit card misuse (Hibbert, Beutler, & Martin, 2004). There is a strong 
association between amount saved by adolescents and amounts saved by their parents, as well as 
between future orientation of adolescents and that of their parents (Webley & Nyhus, 2006). 
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Individuals who recall their parents saving while they were a child have more financial assets 
compared to people whose parents did not save (Han et al., 2009; Williams Shanks, Kim, Loke, & 
Destin, 2010). In sum, parental modeling of financial behavior may significantly affect financial 
behavior of children and adolescents, although most of the evidence on this particular question is 
retrospective. 
Financial socialization within the family may take different forms, such as provision of 
pocket money to young people, paying young people for house chores, discussing money matters 
with young people, monitoring their spending, and encouraging them to save (Barnet-Verzat & 
Wolff, 2002; Webley & Nyhus, 2013). Children receiving no guidance from their parents are found 
to be more financially anxious and have more problematic attitudes towards money(Beutler & 
Dickson, 2008). Some studies (Abramovitch, Freedman, & Pliner, 1991; Fiates, De Mello Castanho 
Amboni, & Teixeira, 2008; McNeal & Yeh, 2003) found that receiving pocket money from parents 
was positively associated with improved financial management skills of young people. However, in 
the study from the British Household Panel Survey, Brown and Taylor (2011) found a negative 
association between receiving pocket money from parents and the probability that child will save the 
money. Furnham (1999) suggests that amount, regularity and rules attached to allowance may be as 
important in altering child’s financial knowledge as the fact of receiving the allowance. Against this 
backdrop, Pliner and his colleagues (Pliner, Freedman, Abramovitch, & Drake, 1996) argued that the 
quality of interaction between child and caregivers—rather than allowance per se—affects financial 
socialization. This argument is in line with another key premise of family financial socialization 
theory, namely, positing that interpersonal family relations may affect the success of an explicit 
attempt to financially socialize family members(Beutler & Dickson, 2008). Family relations are 
defined as “an integrated network of enduring emotional ties, mental representations, and behaviors 
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that connect one person to another over time and across space” (Liable & Thompson, 2007, p.181), 
and may be measured in terms of time use, relationship quality, and communication patterns. 
Warmth in the family relationship, described as a relational construct that reflects the shared 
affect of each member of the family toward the other (J. Kim et al., 2011), can contribute to 
children’s responsiveness to the financial socialization process and, thus, increase the probability that 
children will rely on their parents’ values and attitudes to learn how to attain financial responsibility 
(Clarke, Heaton, Israelsen, & Eggett, 2005). Young people not receiving warmth from their parents 
during difficult financial periods have higher financial anxiety (J. Kim et al., 2011), which is further 
linked to negative financial behaviors, such as compulsive buying (Joireman, Kees, & Sprott, 2010). 
Warmth and trust in the relationship between young people and their parents or other caregivers—
measured by several indicators, such as spending time together (Flouri, 2004; Gudmunson & Danes, 
2011), telling the child that her/his work is appreciated, speaking with the child about her/his 
interests and relationships (J. Kim et al., 2011), and letting children manage their saving 
accounts(Webley & Nyhus, 2006; Xiao, Ford, & Kim, 2011)—can significantly affect the success of 
financial socialization. 
This being said, however, it is worth noting that differences in parenting style may affect 
young people’s saving attitudes and behavior, apart from warmth, frequency, and quality of parental 
communication. For example, some parents, although loving and closely involved in a child’s 
upbringing, may strictly control and monitor consumption activities of young people. These parents 
wish to protect their offspring from economic responsibilities and thus avoid involving young 
people in discussion of financial issues in the family. This may hinder a child’s and adolescent’s 
acquisition of consumer skills and competence. Some other parents, however, may encourage their 
offspring to develop independent views and self-expression, fostering development of young 
people’s consumer skills and competences. These parents believe their children need to learn value 
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of money and be economically independent from early on (C. Kim et al., 2009; Leiser & Ganin, 
1996; Otto, 2013). Family financial socialization may also alter gender roles, which can account for 
strong association between gender and saving behavior. For example, female children and 
adolescents were found to be less comfortable with debt and better money managers. However, due 
to gender norms, they were less involved in banking. They were also allowed to take part-time jobs 
later in life than boys (Furnham, 1999b; Webley & Nyhus, 2013). 
 
2.3. Institutional characteristics 
Institutional approach to saving challenges neoclassical assumption of individual preferences 
being fixed and exogenous; it also questions assumption that saving serves the ultimate goal of 
future consumption (Green, 1991; Hodgson, 1998; North, 2003). Instead, an institutional approach 
suggests that an individual’s consumption and saving preferences can be shaped by wide range of 
economic and social institutions, broadly defined as “rules of the game of a society, or, more 
formally, humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction” (North, 2003, p. 23) 
Within this context, Sherraden suggested the Institutional Theory of Saving (Sherraden, 
1991) positing that individual’s ability to save and accumulate assets is altered by institutions, defined 
as “purposefully created policies, programs, products and services that shape opportunities, 
constraints, and consequences” (Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007, p. 30; also see Ssewamala & 
Sherraden, 2004). According to the Institutional Theory of Saving, people save not only because of 
their individual choices but also due to institutional frameworks that encourage saving behavior. Key 
institutional constructs—advanced by Sherraden and colleagues—as the drivers of individual savings 
include access (e.g., proximity of savings programs and products; use of electronic deposits), 
incentives (e.g., matched deposits; earnings on savings), information (e.g., educational programs to 
increase economic literacy), facilitation (e.g., use of automatic deposits; assistance from program 
16 
staff), expectations (e.g., saving goals), restrictions (e.g., use of assets for specified/stipulated 
purposes only, such as home ownership, educational investment, microenterprise development), and 
security of investments (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; McKernan & Sherraden, 2008; Schreiner & 
Sherraden, 2007). 
Practical testing of the Institutional Theory of Saving was done through the American 
Dream Demonstration (ADD)—1997 to 2002. The ADD was the first and most extensive study of 
matched/incentivized savings accounts for poor and low-income families, under the name: 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). Starting in 1997 until 2002, ADD followed more than 
2,000 low-income participants at 14 community-based program sites across the United States 
(Schreiner, Clancy, & Sherraden, 2002; Schreiner et al., 2001; Sherraden et al., 2000). In addition, 
two federal legislations, the Assets for Independence Act (AFIA) and the Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), supported IDA as a tool to assist low-income families in accumulating 
assets. 
How do Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) work? IDAs are subsidized asset-
building programs in the form of matched savings accounts. Participants receive the matched funds 
(matching rate varies across programs) only for approved asset-building purposes, such as home 
purchase, investment in education, or microenterprise. Participants in IDA programs are also 
provided with financial education and social support (e.g., counseling, reminders and encouragement 
to make regular contributions) (Han et al., 2009; Mills et al., 2008; Schreiner & Sherraden, 2007). 
Numerous studies demonstrate that incentivizing savings helps poor people to save 
(Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2006; Han et al., 2009; Sherraden et al., 2003; Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004). 
In the US, data from the ADD (detailed above) indicated that participants (N =2,377 low-income 
individuals) saved an average of $16.60 per month (Sherraden, 2005), making an average of $2,586 in 
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matched withdrawals (total deposits plus matching) during the 5-year (1997-2002) demonstration 
period (Han & Sherraden, 2009). 
Despite this evidence, however, effects of these subsidized savings accounts programs on 
increasing savings are inconclusive (Huang, 2010; Lerman & McKernan, 2008; Mills et al., 2008). 
This partially stems from conceptual ambivalence: subsidized asset-building programs can generate 
either an income effect or a substitution effect. In the case of an income effect, participation in 
subsidized savings programs, for example IDA participation, would generate additional resources 
that could be used to increase savings. In the case of a substitution effect (also known as a portfolio 
effect), one type of asset would be substituted for another type, thus not necessarily leading to an 
increase in actual accumulation of (new) savings. These effects can offset each other. 
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CHAPTER 3: CHILD SAVINGS ACCOUNTS 
 
This dissertation focuses specifically on saving behavior and attitudes of adolescents in subsidized 
matched Child Savings Accounts (CSA). 
 
3.1. General overview 
Child Savings Accounts are a form of Individual Development Account, specifically targeted 
to children and adolescents. Consequently, the design and operation of existing CSA are guided by 
the Institutional Theory of Saving. With a CSA, a bank account is opened in a child’s or adolescent’s 
name. In this sense some asset-development scholars and programmers have argued that CSAs 
allow for distinguishing between parental assets and children’s assets (Elliott, Choi, Destin, & Kim, 
2011; Elliott, Jung, & Friedline, 2010; Elliott, Kim, Jung, & Zhan, 2010; Meyer, Masa, & 
Zimmerman, 2010). As bank accounts open in the names of children or adolescents, CSAs tend to 
have the following institutional features, guided by institutional theory constructs: (1) Incentives: 
intended to incentivize savings. Specifically, CSAs offer financial incentives in the form of a 
matching and/or account opening amount to the child and their parent; (2) Information: providing 
educational programming in the form of financial education and/or peer support; (3) Limits: 
imposing withdrawal restriction; 4) Facilitation: by having mentorship programs and peer support 
intended to facilitate savings; 5) Access:  by bringing financial institutions closer to the participants, 
specifically during accounts opening. The mobilization for accounts opening is done in schools, and 
all accounts are opened in schools and facilitated by a bank representative. 
Child Savings Accounts, as a type of youth savings products, are increasingly being provided 
by financial institutions across the globe. Examples of such accounts would be the Safe and Smart 
Savings program for vulnerable adolescent girls in Kenya and Uganda, supported by the Population 
Council; Early Start Savings Accounts, provided by PostBank in Uganda; Zawadi Accounts, opened 
19 
by parents and guardians on behalf of their children with Akiba Commercial Bank in Tanzania; and 
Butterflies Children’s Development Bank, for the street and working children in South Asia. 
However, Child Development Accounts offering matching incentives are not very common in 
developing countries. Specifically, as of this writing, I have been able to identify three developing 
countries offering CSAs: (1) South Africa: Fundisa accounts; (2) Uganda: SEED/Suubi/Suubi-Maka 
accounts; and (3) Sri Lanka: SingithiKirikatiyo accounts. Additionally, matched CSA are functioning 
in Singapore, Canada, Korea, USA and the UK2. 
CSAs have not been implemented long enough to evaluate their long term impacts on 
developing human capital, alleviating poverty, and enhancing socio-economic capacities of children 
and adolescents who hold these accounts. This being said, however, existing short and medium term 
evaluations of studies on asset accumulation in the form of CSAs show a positive association 
between asset accumulation and children’s certainty about accomplishing their educational plans, as 
well as children’s improved grades in their Primary Leaving Examination. Additionally, children with 
CSAs were less likely to report high risk-taking attitudes (Curley, Ssewamala, & Han, 2010; 
Ssewamala et al., 2009; Ssewamala, Han, et al., 2010; Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 2009). 
Compared to other development approaches, including direct investments in education, 
health, and physical infrastructure development, CSAs specifically aim at promoting certain 
behavioral changes towards individual empowerment and self-sustenance, through saving and asset 
accumulation. CSAs target saving attitudes and behaviors not only of parents but also of children, 
thus aiming to contribute to the long-term goal of inter-generational mobility out of poverty. This 
being said, however, further research and additional evidence are required to support this claim. 
 
                                                 
2 Child Trust Fund (CDA in UK) was terminated in 2010: children born after 2 January 2011 no 
longer qualify for the program. 
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3.2. “Suubi” accounts in Uganda 
For this dissertation I use data from the NIH-funded Suubi-Maka experimental intervention 
program (Grant # R34MH081763A). The Suubi-Maka study was approved by Columbia University 
Institutional Review Board (IRB #AAAD2525) and Uganda National Council of Science and 
Technology, the local IRB in Uganda (SS #1540). The study is based on an asset-based approach to 
adolescent development and tests the feasibility of family-based economic empowerment 
intervention through subsidized matched savings accounts offered to school-going AIDS-orphaned 
adolescents (average age of 13 years old) in Uganda. The study design and intervention are detailed 
later under the “Methods” chapter.  
The Suubi-Maka study implemented in 2008-2012 extends two previous studies: (1) the 
SEED pilot study implemented in 2004-2006 with N=100 school-going AIDS-orphaned 
adolescents; and (2) the NIH-funded Suubi study (Grant #R21MH076484-01) implemented in 
2006-2008 with N=286 AIDS-orphaned adolescents. All three studies were administered in Rakai 
and Masaka districts—regions of Uganda heavily affected by HIV/AIDS. The first case of 
HIV/AIDS in Uganda was recorded in Rakai district (Serwadda et al., 1985; Sewankambo et al., 
2000). The most recent data shows 9% and 11% HIV prevalence rates in Masaka and Rakai districts 
correspondingly (Zaba et al., 2013), against the national average prevalence rate of 6.7% (UNAIDS 
& Uganda AIDS Commission, 2012). In Rakai district, one in five children is likely to be an AIDS 
orphan, having lost one or both parents to HIV/AIDS (Makumbi, 2005). 
Each of the three studies used cluster randomized experimental designs, which randomly 
assign public schools to a control or an experimental condition. Selected schools were at the same 
level of performance. Participants in the experimental condition received an intervention bundle 
consisting of three components: (1) subsidized matched savings accounts; (2) financial training; and 
(3) monthly mentorship sessions. 
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Both studies preceding Suubi-Maka, specifically SEED and Suubi, have been extensively 
evaluated using variety of methods, including multivariate regression models, mediation models, 
generalized linear models (GLM), and generalized estimating equation models (GEE). In these 
scientific evaluations, Ssewamala and colleagues examine a wide range of psycho-social outcomes, 
including family relations indicators, adolescent hopelessness scale, depression scale, educational 
aspirations, academic performance, school attendance, sexual risk-taking behavior, guardian’s mental 
functioning scale, and saving outcomes. Results from these evaluations indicated that participants in 
the treatment group were able to save (Ssewamala et al., 2009; Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 2009; 
Ssewamala, Karimli, Han, & Ismayilova, 2010). For example, participants in Suubi (2005-2008) saved 
an average of US$75.96 per year in net deposits. After the program matched their savings on a 2:1 
rate, participants accumulated an average of US$228 per year—which is a substantial sum in a poor 
country like Uganda, and can cover the cost of anywhere between 1.5 to 2 years of post-primary 
education in a semi-urban school. Results also indicate that participants in the treatment group 
report: greater educational aspirations and better academic performance (Curley et al., 2010; 
Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 2009), less intentions to engage in sexual risk taking behaviors (Ismayilova, 
Ssewamala, & Karimli, 2012; Ssewamala, Alicea, Bannon Jr, & Ismayilova, 2008; Ssewamala, Han, et 
al., 2010; Ssewamala, Ismayilova, et al., 2010), and lower levels of hopelessness and depression (Han 
et al., 2013; Kagotho & Ssewamala, 2012; Ssewamala et al., 2009; Ssewamala et al., 2012; Wang, 
Ssewamala, & Han, 2012), compared to participants in the control group. 
The main hypotheses tested, thus far, in the publications out of the Suubi studies center 
around the Institutional Theory of Saving and the asset-based approach to adolescent development, 
two theories that augment each other and together posit that subsidized matched savings accounts 
help poor families accumulate assets, which, in turn generates positive psycho-social effects for 
adolescents and their families. This being said, however, to the best of my knowledge, the intervention 
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effect on accumulation of financial assets (savings) has not been tested in these studies. More 
specifically, no published work out of the Suubi studies, or any other rigorously designed studies that 
I am aware of, test the intervention effect of subsidized matched savings accounts on the saving attitude 
and behavior of poor and vulnerable adolescents, including AIDS-orphaned adolescents. For that 
reason, this dissertation aims at examining the intervention effect of participation in subsidized 
matched savings program on saving attitudes and financial asset accumulation of the school-going 
orphaned adolescents. In the proceeding chapter, I provide details of the study aims.  
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY AIMS 
 
This dissertation aims at examining the intervention effect of participation in subsidized 
matched savings program on saving attitudes and financial asset accumulation of the school-going 
orphaned adolescents (average age of 13) taken care by a living parent (adolescents who have lost 
one parent) or by an adult guardian within extended family (adolescents who have lost both parents). 
The dissertation rests in realm of interdisciplinary research and employs an integrated 
theoretical framework (described in Chapter 2) to examine adolescents’ saving attitudes and financial 
asset accumulation in a subsidized matched savings program. Figures 1-5 illustrate specific study 
aims of this dissertation. 
Aim 1: to examine the intervention effect of the Suubi-Maka intervention—above and beyond 
the effect of individual and family characteristics—on adolescents’ saving attitudes and financial 
asset accumulation (Figures 1 & 2). Conforming to integrated theoretical framework described 
earlier, analyses look into the sequential effects of individual characteristics (i.e., adolescents’ age, 
gender, orphanhood status, hopelessness, educational plans and aspirations), family characteristics 
(i.e., family relations, family financial socialization, and household demographics), and institutional 
characteristics (i.e. Suubi-Maka intervention administered as a “bundle” that includes offered 
opportunity to open Child Savings Account, matched monthly deposits, and financial training) on 
outcomes of interest. In line with the Institutional Theory of Saving, the intervention is 
hypothesized to have an independent intervention effect on adolescents’ saving attitudes and 
financial asset accumulation (detailed list of hypotheses is provided in Chapter 5: Methods). 
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Intervention “bundle” including: 
- Offered opportunity to open Child 
Savings Account 
- Matching monthly deposits 





- Reported willingness to save 
- Reported confidence in saving 
money 
FAMILY CHARACTERISTICS 
- Family relations (i.e., family 
cohesion reported by adolescent, 
family cohesion reported by 
guardian) 
- Family financial socialization (i.e., 
adolescent’s knowledge of 
guardian saving for her/him; 
guardian’s self-reported saving; 
guardian’s reported willingness to 
save) 
- Household demographics (i.e., 
guardian’s age and gender, type of 
guardian, number of children in 
the household, number of earners 
in the household) 
INDIVIDUAL 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Adolescent’s age, gender, orphanhood 
status, hopelessness, educational plans, 
and educational aspirations 
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Aim 2: to examine whether the family characteristics (such as family relations, family 
financial socialization, and household demographics) moderate the effect of the intervention on 
adolescents' saving attitudes and self-reported financial asset accumulation (Figures 3 & 4). In line 
with the Family Financial Socialization approach, family characteristics are hypothesized to shape 
the size and/or the direction of the intervention effect on outcomes of interest (detailed list of 
hypotheses is provided in Chapter 5: Methods). 
 



















































Adolescent’s saving attitudes 
 
- Reported willingness to save 
- Reported confidence in saving money 
Moderator effect 
PREDICTOR: 
Intervention “bundle” including: 
- Offered opportunity to open 
Child Savings Account 
- Matching monthly deposits 
- Financial training 
MODERATORS: 
Family characteristics 
- Family relations (i.e., family 
cohesion reported by adolescent, 
family cohesion reported by 
guardian) 
- Family financial socialization (i.e., 
adolescent’s knowledge of guardian 
saving for her/him; guardian’s self-
reported saving; guardian’s 
reported willingness to save) 
- Household demographics (i.e., 
guardian’s age and gender, type of 
guardian, number of children in the 








Aim 3: to identify specific pathways for the effect of the intervention on adolescents' saving 




















































Adolescent’s self-reported financial 
asset accumulation 
 
- Self-reported saving (“Do you currently 
have any money saved anywhere? Yes/No”) 
- Self-reported amount saved 
Moderator effect 
PREDICTOR: 
Intervention “bundle” including: 
- Offered opportunity to open 
Child Savings Account 
- Matching monthly deposits 
- Financial training 
MODERATORS: 
Family characteristics 
- Family relations (i.e., family 
cohesion reported by adolescent, 
family cohesion reported by 
guardian) 
- Family financial socialization (i.e., 
adolescent’s knowledge of 
guardian saving for her/him; 
guardian’s self-reported saving; 
guardian’s reported willingness to 
save) 
- Household demographics (i.e., 
guardian’s age and gender, type 
of guardian, number of children 
in the household, number of 
earners in the household) 
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Theory of Saving and the Family Financial Socialization approach, adolescents' future orientation 
and the family financial socialization are hypothesized as mechanisms transmitting the effect of the 
intervention on outcomes of interest (detailed list of hypotheses is provided in Chapter 5: Methods) 
 
























































financial asset accumulation 
 
- Self-reported saving (“Do you 
currently have any money saved anywhere? 
Yes/No”) 
- Self-reported amount saved 
PREDICTOR 
Intervention “bundle” including: 
- Offered opportunity to open 
Child Savings Account 
- Matching monthly deposits 
- Financial training 
MEDIATOR 
Family financial socialization 
 
- Adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving 
for her/him; 
- Guardian’s self-reported saving 
- Guardian’s reported willingness to save 
MEDIATOR 
Adolescent’s future orientation 
 
- Adolescent’s hopelessness 
- Adolescent’s educational plans 
- Adolescent’s educational aspirations 
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CHAPTER 5: METHODS 
 
5.1. Intervention design and study sample 
This dissertation uses longitudinal (3 years3) data collected within the cluster-randomized 
Suubi-Maka study4. The study was situated in 10 rural public primary schools in the Rakai and 
Masaka districts of Uganda. The schools were randomly assigned to control (n=5) and treatment 
(n=5) conditions. The schools included in the study were at a comparable level of performance 
based on PLE5 (Primary Leaving Examination) grades.  
Adolescents were included in the study based on the following criteria: (1) an orphan, having 
lost one or both parents to HIV/AIDS; (2) enrolled in the last two years of primary school; (3) 
living with a family. To be enrolled in the study, adolescents and their guardians should have 
expressed their interest in participating and provided their informed consent (in case of guardians) 
and assent (in case of adolescents). 
Each adolescent in the control condition received the usual reactive services for orphans, 
hereafter referred to as usual care. The usual care is composed of: provision of recreation services, 
counseling, food aid (specifically school lunches) and scholastic materials (including text books) 
sponsored and/or administered by Diocese of Masaka, the local partner institution. 
                                                 
3 The data was at a baseline (Year 1), a 12-month follow-up (Year 2), and a 24-mohth follow-up 
(Year 3) 
4 The study is introduced earlier in Chapter 3: Child Savings Accounts (see sub-section 3.2. “Suubi” 
accounts in Uganda) 
5 The PLE is a nationally administered examination taken by students in the seventh grade (which is 
the last grade in Uganda’s primary schooling system). 
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Adolescents in the treatment group had matched savings accounts (Child Savings Accounts) 
opened for them. Each month, deposits of up to UGX 20,000 (US$10) were subject to matching 
grants, if utilized for specific purposes, such as (1) post-primary schooling or training; and/or (2) 
investment in a small family business. Thus, the match cap – the maximum amount of family 
contribution to be matched by the intervention program was equivalent to US$10 per month per 
family. Following the first 6-months of participating in the intervention during which participants 
were involved in financial management trainings, participants were allowed to make matched 
withdrawals—provided the money was going to one of the two designated uses (education or 
starting a small business). The matching funds were kept in a separate account from a participant’s 
own savings and were not accessible to the participant. When a participant was ready to attend 
secondary school or vocational training, the bank check/voucher for the matching funds was written 
directly to the school the student selected to attend, while the student contributed his/her portion 
(1/3) of the total cost for the academic term. If the adolescent withdrew their personal savings for 
purposes other than those specified by the Suubi-Maka project, they would forego the associated 
match. The process was designed to eliminate the temptation for families to pressure their 
adolescents to withdraw the money for their own use. It was also intended to avoid potential misuse 
of the matching funds by the adolescents' family members or guardians. 
In addition to this, participants in the treatment group, both adolescents and their guardians, 
received three financial education sessions on micro-enterprise development conducted by financial 
institutions. 
Adolescents in both the treatment and control group were offered 8 mentorship sessions on 
the following topics: (1) Overview of the program; (2) Curriculum review; practice makes perfect; (3) 
Self-esteem, education planning and setting goals; (4) HIV/AIDS and STD knowledge; (5) 
HIV/AIDS stigma and discrimination; (6) Puberty and ABC model; (7) Identifying risk and peer 
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pressure; (8) Negotiation and refusal skills for risky behavior. In addition, adolescents in the 
treatment group were offered one extra session specifically focused on savings and asset-building. 
The study collected 3 waves of data on 346 AIDS-orphaned adolescents and their guardians 
(N=346 dyads) over the course of 24 months. Baseline data were collected prior to random 
assignment. Wave 2 and Wave 3 data were collected correspondingly 12 months and 24 months 
following the start of intervention. Five schools were in the control group (n=167 dyads: 
adolescents and their guardians) and 5 schools were in the treatment group (n=179 dyads: 
adolescents and their guardians). 
 
5.2. Missing data 
For adolescents, attrition rate is 4% from Wave 1 (N=346) to Wave 2 (N=331), and 8.4% 
from Wave 1 to Wave 3 (N=317). Only 4 cases (1% of sample at baseline) are missing at both Wave 
2 and Wave 3. For the rest of missing data on adolescents, 11 cases (3% of sample at baseline) are 
missing only at Wave 2, while 25 other cases (7% of sample at baseline) are missing only at Wave 3. 
For guardians, attrition rate is 3.5% from Wave 1 (N=346) to Wave 2 (N=334), and 3% 
from Wave 1 to Wave 3 (N=335). Only 2 cases (0.6% of sample at baseline) are missing at both 
Wave 2 and Wave 3. For the rest of missing data on guardians, 10 cases (2.9% of sample at baseline) 
are missing only at Wave 2, while 9 other cases (2.6% of sample at baseline) are missing only at 
Wave 3. 
At the stage of designing the Suubi-Maka intervention, power analysis were conducted for 
the whole study, using an attrition rate of 10%. With a starting sample size of 346 dyads and attrition 
rate of 10% the study would have sufficient statistical power to obtain reliable point estimates, 
confidence intervals, and detect small to medium effect sizes at 80% (see details under sub-section 
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5.6.Statistical Power, page 53). The observed attrition rate of 4% at Wave 2 and 8.4% at Wave 3 are 
lower than the expected attrition rate in power analysis at the study design.  
To handle missing data, multiple-imputation (MI) was applied as the most robust method 
that (1) allows to incorporate auxiliary information about the missing data, and (2) provides standard 
errors and p-values that account for missing-data uncertainty (Little et al., 2012; Moodie, Delaney, 
Lefebvre, & Platt, 2008). Missing observations were imputed separately for treatment and control 
groups using chained multiple imputations in Stata 12. The two groups were then combined into 
one dataset for subsequent data analyses. Given that data has less than 10% of missing information, 
the number of imputations in MI model was set to 20 to ensure sufficient statistical efficiency for 
hypothesis tests. To account for clustering of data within schools, school dummy variables were 
included in the MI model (Graham, 2009). The two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality 
of distribution functions was run to compare distributions of the imputed values with those of the 
original observed values (White, Royston, & Wood, 2011). Results of tests (Table A.1.) showed 
similar distributions between the original and imputed data. Inferential analyses described in sub-
section 5.5. Statistical Analyses were run on imputed data. Results are described in the “Results” 
chapter of the dissertation. 
 
5.3. Measures 
Suubi-Maka used multiple methods in data collection, specifically: (1) a 90-minute individual 
instrument administered with adolescents at three time points (baseline, 10-12 months, and 20-24 
months post project implementation initiation); (2) a 90-minute individual instruments administered 
with guardians at three time points (baseline, 10-12 months, and 20-24 months post project 
implementation initiation); (3) administrative data on saving for the treatment group participants. 
The program directly obtained quarterly financial statements from the banks holding the Children 
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Savings Account; and (4) administrative data obtained directly from the schools to which the 
participants (both control and treatment condition adolescents) were enrolled. Specifically, the 
program obtained participants’ school attendance and termly grades. The protocols and instruments 
for the Suubi-Maka study were initially developed for SEED-Uganda pilot study (Ismayilova, 
Ssewamala, Mooers, Nabunya, & Sheshadri, 2012; Ssewamala, 2005; Ssewamala et al., 2008), with 
few savings-related items adapted from surveys evaluating the American Dream Demonstration 
(Sherraden et al., 2000). All instruments (and protocols) were extensively tested within multiple 
Suubi studies implemented since 20046. 
For the analysis in this dissertation, I use three types of data listed above (i.e. instrument 
administered with adolescents (at three time points), instrument administered with guardians (at 
three time points), and administrative data on saving obtained directly from the banks during the 
study implementation period (2008 to 2012): questions investigated in the dissertation do not require 
using administrative data from school records on participants' performance and grades. 
 
5.3 (a). Outcome measures: adolescents’ saving attitudes 
Adolescents’ savings attitudes, defined as an adolescents’ inclination to respond favorably 
or unfavorably to accumulating financial assets in the form of savings (Ajzen, 1989; Xiao, 2008), are 
measuring using the following: 
 Adolescents’ reported willingness to save. This is an ordinal variable that corresponds to the 
question from Child Assessment instrument asking “If you had Uganda Shillings 10,000, what would 
you do?”  The question was measured using a 6-response category: 1=“spend all of it”, 2=”spend 
most of it”, 3=”spend half, save half”, 4=”save most of it”, 5=”save all of it”, and 6=“buy a 
                                                 
6 Described in Chapter 3: Child Savings Accounts (see sub-section 3.2. “Suubi” accounts in Uganda) 
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cow, goat, pig, chicken, rabbit, or other animal that would eventually bring in money”. In the 
analysis, I collapsed the original 6-response category to four choices. This was intended to 
address cells with inadequately small frequencies (Marsh & Elliott, 2008) produced by the 
original scale. In the collapsed scale, I used the following 4 choices: 1=”spend”, 2=”spend half, 
save half”, 3=”save”, and 4=”invest”. The higher the score, the more favorable is the 
adolescents’ attitude to saving money. 
 Adolescents’ reported confidence in saving money. This is an average score for an index 
consisting of six items each measured on a 4-point Likert scale, where 1= “not confident at all”, 
2=”not very confident”, 3=”a little confident” and 4=“very confident”. The scale corresponds 
to the question from Child Assessment instrument asking “For each of the following statements, please 
tell me if you are very confident, a little confident, not very confident, and not confident at all: (a) saving money for 
a family business; (b) saving money for education; (c) saving money for vocational, technical or job training; (d) 
saving money for family use; (e) saving money to buy an animal such as a goat, pig, and cow; and (f) saving money 
to move into one’s own home. The average score ranges from 1 (“not confident at all”) to 4 (“very 
confident”). The scale has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.78 at baseline, 0.79 at 
a 12-month follow-up, and 0.67 at a 24-month follow-up). 
 
5.3 (b). Outcome measures: adolescents’ financial asset accumulation 
In order to measure adolescent’s financial asset accumulation, I use two forms of data 
collected from the Suubi-Maka study participants: adolescent self-reported savings data, and 
administrative data obtained directly from the financial institutions (for participants in the treatment 
condition with child savings accounts). Specifically, to measure self-reported savings, I use the 
following two items: 
 Adolescent’s self-reported saving. This is a binary variable dichotomized as “Yes” or “No”. It 
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was asked of all participants in the study. It corresponds to the question from Child Assessment 
instrument asking “Do you currently have any money saved anywhere? Yes/No”. 
 Adolescent’s self-reported amount saved. This is a continuous variable—also asked of all the 
participants in the study—and corresponds to the question from Child Assessment instrument 
asking “How much money do you currently have saved?” This measure has non-zero values only for 
adolescents who responded “Yes” to question “Do you currently have any money saved anywhere?”. To 
correct for non-normal distribution (Skewness=2.07, Kurtosis=6.7), this variable was 
transformed by a natural log. 
To verify self-reported data on savings, I ran additional analyses7 using administrative data 
on savings obtained directly from the banks where Child Savings Accounts were opened for 
participants. The following measures are used: 
 Having active Child Savings Account. This is a binary variable dichotomized as “Yes” and “No”. 
The variable was coded as 1=”Yes” for all the participants who opened an account, activated it, 
and deposited at least once. The variable was coded as 0=“No” for all the participants who 
either never opened an account, or opened account but never activated it, or opened account, 
activated it, but never deposited a sum greater than zero. 
 Average monthly savings per participants. This is a continuous variable obtained by subtracting 
total unmatched withdrawals from total deposits and dividing this amount by the number of 
months in which the participant made deposits. This measure has non-zero values only for 
adolescents who deposited at least once.  
 
                                                 
7 Analyses are described in details later in this chapter (see sub-section 5.3(a) Aim 1: Independent effect of 
intervention) 
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5.3 (c). Individual characteristics measures 
 Adolescent’s age. This is a continuous variable corresponding to the question from Child 
Assessment instrument: How old are you?”. It measures adolescent’s age in years. 
 Adolescent’s gender. This is a nominal variable dichotomized as “Male” or ”Female”. 
 Adolescent’s orphanhood status. This is a nominal variable with three mutually exclusive 
response categories: “Double orphan” (reports both parents not alive),”Single paternal orphan” 
(reports father not alive), and “Single maternal orphan” (reports mother not alive). The variable 
was computed using two questions from the Child Assessment instrument: “Is your father still 
alive? Yes/No” and “Is your mother still alive? Yes/No”. 
 Adolescent’s hopelessness is measured using the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS). The scale was 
designed operationally to define and quantify the concept of hopelessness. It measures 
respondent’s pessimistic outlook and negative expectations about events in her/his future 
(Dozois & Covin, 2004; Katz, Katz, & Shaw, 1999). It is a 20-item self-report inventory, where 
each item is a binary variable with two response categories (True/False). The higher score is 
assigned to 11 items for a true response and to the 9 items for the false response. The total score 
is obtained by summing the score of 20 items. The score ranges from 0 (no hopelessness) to 20 
(absence of all hope). The measure has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha=0.68 at 
baseline; and Cronbach’s alpha=0.7 at both a 12-month follow-up and a 24-month follow-up). 
 Adolescent’s educational plans. This is a binary variable that corresponds to the question from 
Child Assessment instrument asking “What are your educational plans after completing primary school” 
and dichotomized as 0=”Not planning to start secondary school”, and 1=”Planning to start 
secondary school”. 
 Adolescent’s educational aspirations. This is an ordinal variable corresponding to the question 
from Child Assessment instrument asking “Thinking back on the questions you have answered so far, how 
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far do you really believe you will go in school?. Original variable has seven response choices: 1=”Drop 
out before Primary 7”, 2=”Drop out before Senior 4”, 3=“Complete Senior 4 and stop”, 
4=”Go on to senior 6 and stop”, 5=”Go on to technical college”, 6=”Go on to the university 
and get a degree”, and 7=”Finish university and go on to graduate school to get a second 
degree”. To avoid cells with inadequately small frequencies, the variable was recoded to have 
five response categories instead of seven: 1=”Drop at any stage before completing secondary 
school”, 2=”Complete secondary school and stop”, 3=“Go on to technical college”, 4=”Go on 
to the university to get a degree”, 5=”Finish university and go on to graduate school to get a 
second degree”. 
 
5.3 (d). Family characteristics measures 
Items in the family cohesion measure were adapted from two scales. First, the Social Support 
Behaviors Scale (SS-B) (Vaux, 1987) asks participants how likely and how often a family member 
performs the specific supportive behavior, and examines emotional support and advice/guidance 
among family members. Second, a subscale from the Family Environment Scale/Family Assessment 
Measures (FES/FAM), designed for urban African American and Latino families, assesses family 
cohesion, beliefs about family, and family communication (Tolan, Gorman-Smith, Huesmann, & 
Zelli, 1997; Tolan, Hanish, McKay, & Dickey, 2002). Both of these measures have been used in 
Africa with excellent psychometric properties (Bhana, 2004).  
To measure family relations, two scales are used: family cohesion reported by adolescent, 
and family cohesion reported by guardian. Correlation between these two measures was tested using 
xtgee regression in Stata 12 accounting for standard errors clustered within subjects due to the 
repeated-measures nature of data. Results showed no significant correlation between family cohesion 
reported by the guardian and family cohesion reported by the adolescent (B=-0.04; 95% CI=-0.1; 0.02; p=0.2) 
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 Family cohesion reported by adolescent: an average score for an index of 26 items asking the 
adolescent to indicate how often family members perform a certain type of behavior, e.g. “Do 
your family members ask each other for help before asking non-family member for help?”, “Do your parents take 
time to listen to you when you want to talk to them?”, “Does your current parent/guardian show interest in your 
schoolwork?”. Each item is measured on a 5-point Likert scale, with 1=”never”, 2=”rarely”, 
3=”sometimes”, 4=”most of the time”, and 5=”always”. The average score of family cohesion 
ranges from 1 to 5. The higher the score, the higher the level of family cohesion. The measure 
has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.79 at baseline, 0.78 at the 12-month follow-
up, and 0.79 at the 24-month follow-up). For full list of items constituting the family cohesion 
scale, see Table A.3. on page 133. 
 Family cohesion reported by guardian: items comprising this measure are identical to those 
enclosed in “family cohesion reported by a child”, but correspond to the Guardian Assessment 
instrument. The measure has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha is 0.73 at baseline, 0.77 
at a 12-month follow-up, and 0.79 at a 24-month follow-up). 
Family financial socialization is measured using three scales: 
 Adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him. This is a nominal variable with three 
response categories: 1=”Adolescent does not know whether parent/guardian saves for 
her/him”, 2=”Adolescent knows that parent/guardian does not save for her/him”, and 
3=”Adolescent knows that parent/guardian saves for her/him”. The variable corresponds to a 
question from Child Assessment instrument: “Are your current parent(s) or guardian(s) saving any 
money for you?” (with response categories 1=Yes, 0=No, 888=Don’t know). 
 Guardian’s reported willingness to save. This is an ordinal variable that corresponds to the 
question from Guardian Assessment instrument asking “If you had Uganda Shillings 10,000, what 
would you do?” The question has six response categories: 1=“spend all of it”, 2=”spend most of 
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it”, 3=”spend half, save half”, 4=”save most of it”, 5=”save all of it”, and 6=“buy a cow, goat, 
pig, chicken, rabbit, or other animal that would eventually bring in money”. The higher the 
score, the more favorable is the guardian’s attitude to saving money. 
 Guardian’s self-reported saving. This is a binary variable dichotomized as “Yes” or “No”. It 
corresponds to the question from Guardian Assessment instrument asking “Do you currently have 
any money saved anywhere? Yes/No 
Household demographics are measured by the following items: 
 The number of earners in the household, a binary variable dichotomized as “Single-earner 
family”, and “Double-earner family”. The variable was computed using two questions from the 
Guardian Assessment instrument: “Do you financially support your family? Yes/No”, and “Does 
someone else (apart from yourself) financially support your family? Yes/No”. 
 Number of children in the household, a continuous variable that corresponds to the question 
from Guardian Assessment instrument asking “Besides the child/children involved in the study, how 
many of the people who live in your household are children? Please indicate all of the children 17 years old or 
younger who stay with you most of the time.” 
 Guardian’s age, a continuous variable corresponding to the question from Guardian Assessment 
instrument: How old are you?” 
 Guardian’s gender, a nominal variable dichotomized as “Male” or ”Female”. 
 Type of guardian, a nominal variable indicating the guardian’s relationship to adolescent. It has 
three mutually exclusive response categories: “parents”, “grandparents”, and “other relatives”. The 
variable was created by de-stringing and re-coding an open-ended question from Guardian 
Assessment instrument asking “What is your relation to child?” Original responses to this open-
ended question included “mother”, “father”, “grandfather”, “grandmother”, “sister”, “brother”, 
“aunt”, “uncle”, “cousin”, “step-mother”, “step-father”, “god-mother”, “god-father”. 
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5.3 (e). Institutional characteristics measure 
The institutional characteristic measure is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the 
adolescent (and her/his guardian) were in the treatment or in the control group. The intervention 
effect is measured through the group-by-time interaction, where group is coded “0” if participant is 
in control group and “1” if participant is in treatment group; and time is coded as 1=”baseline”, 
2=”12-month follow-up”, and 3=”24-month follow-up”. 
 
5.4. Hypotheses 
5.4 (a). Aim 1: Independent effect of intervention 
Hypotheses in Aim 1 test whether institutional characteristics (i.e. intervention) 
independently account for changes in adolescents saving attitudes and self-reported financial asset 
accumulation, above and beyond individual and family characteristics. 
Hypothesis 1.1: Controlling for individual and family characteristics, adolescents in the 
treatment group will report higher willingness to save compared with adolescents in the control group8. 
Hypothesis 1.2: Controlling for individual and family characteristics, adolescents in the 
treatment group will report higher confidence in saving money compared with adolescents in the control 
group. 
                                                 
8 Differential changes in the outcome variable over time—for both treatment and control group—
will be measured at 12 months and at 24 months. Analyses examine the marginal effect of 
intervention on the outcome variable over the course of the study by looking into the group-by-time 
interaction at a 12-month follow-up and a 24-month follow-up. The same logic applies to 
hypotheses 1.2 – 1.4. Formal descriptions of models are provided later in this chapter (see sub-
section 5.5.Statistical Analyses). 
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Hypothesis 1.3: Controlling for individual and family characteristics, adolescents in the 
treatment group will be more likely to report having saved money somewhere, than adolescents in the 
control group. 
Hypothesis 1.4: Controlling for individual and family characteristics, adolescents in the 
treatment group will report higher amounts saved, compared with adolescents in the control group. 
 
5.4 (b). Aim 2: Moderator effect of family characteristics 
Hypotheses in Aim 2 test whether (1) family relations, (2) family financial socialization, and 
(3) household demographics affect the direction and strength of intervention effect on outcome 
measures, namely on reported willingness to save, reported confidence in saving money, self-reported saving, and 
self-reported amount saved. 
Hypothesis 2.1.1.: Adolescents in families with better quality of family relations will report 
higher willingness to save as a result of intervention at 24-months, compared to adolescents in families 
with lower quality of family relations. 
Hypothesis 2.1.2: Adolescents in families with better quality of family relations will report 
higher confidence in saving money as a result of intervention at 24-months, compared to adolescents in 
families with lower quality of family relations. 
Hypothesis 2.1.3: Adolescents in families with better quality of family relations will be more 
likely to report having saved money somewhere as a result of intervention at 24-months, compared to 
adolescents in families with lower quality of family relations. 
Hypothesis 2.1.4: Adolescents in families with better quality of family relations will report 
higher amounts saved as a result of intervention at 24-months, compared to adolescents in families with 
lower quality of family relations. 
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Hypothesis 2.2.1.: Adolescents in families with stronger family financial socialization will 
report higher willingness to save as a result of intervention at 24-months, compared to adolescents in 
families with lower quality of family relations. 
Hypothesis 2.2.2: Adolescents in families with stronger family financial socialization will 
report higher confidence in saving money as a result of intervention at 24-months, compared to 
adolescents in families with lower quality of family relations. 
Hypothesis 2.2.3: Adolescents in families with stronger family financial socialization will be 
more likely to report having saved money somewhere as a result of intervention at 24-months, compared to 
adolescents in families with lower quality of family relations. 
Hypothesis 2.2.4: Adolescents in families with stronger family financial socialization will 
report higher amounts saved as a result of intervention at 24-months, compared to adolescents in families 
with lower quality of family relations. 
Hypothesis 2.3.1.: The household’s demographic characteristics will influence (in terms of 
the direction and/or the strength) the effect of the intervention on adolescent’s willingness to save at 
24-months. 
Hypothesis 2.3.2: The household’s demographic characteristics will influence (in terms of the 
direction and/or the strength) the effect of the intervention on adolescent’s confidence to saving money 
at 24-months. 
Hypothesis 2.3.3: The household’s demographic characteristics will influence (in terms of the 
direction and/or the strength) the effect of the intervention on adolescent’s self-reported saving 24-
months. 
Hypothesis 2.3.4: The household’s demographic characteristics will influence (in terms of the 




5.4 (c). Aim 3: Mediator effect of adolescent’s future orientation and family financial 
socialization 
Hypothesis 3.1.1: In comparison with the control group, participation in the treatment group 
will increase the likelihood of adolescents reporting having saved money somewhere by increasing 
adolescents’ future orientation. 
Hypothesis 3.1.2: In comparison with the control group, participation in the treatment group 
will increase the likelihood of adolescents reported amounts saved by increasing adolescents’ future 
orientation. 
Hypothesis 3.2.1: In comparison with the control group, participation in the treatment group 
will increase the likelihood of adolescents reporting having saved money somewhere by improving family 
financial socialization. 
Hypothesis 3.2.2: In comparison with the control group, participation in the treatment group 
will increase the likelihood of adolescents reported amounts saved by improving family financial 
socialization. 
 
5.5. Statistical Analyses 
The data hierarchy has four levels: time-specific observations, individual observations, 
family-specific observations, and school-specific observations. Some observations are nested within 
families: out of the total sample (N=346), 22 families each had 2 adolescents and one guardian 
enrolled in the study, and 1 family had 3 adolescents and 1 guardian enrolled in the study. All other 
families each had only one adolescent and one guardian enrolled in the study. In order to decide 
whether families should be treated as a separate cluster, two types of analyses were conducted. First, 
intraclass correlations were calculated to assess homogeneity of model outcomes within a cluster, i.e. 
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families. Results showed small values of within-family variance relative to the total variance. Second, 
models nested in families were compared to models not nested in families using Likelihood Ratio 
tests. Results (Table A.2.) showed no significant differences between models (Gelman & Hill, 2007; 
West, Welch, & Galecki, 2007). Based on these results, it was concluded that analyses do not need to 
account for some cases being nested within families. 
Observations are also nested within schools with significant intraclass correlations among 
schools. Given the school-clustered repeated-measures nature of the data collected on the same 
adolescents and their guardians over the three waves, measurements are likely to be correlated. 
Statistical models described below and data analyses (performed in Stata 12) account for this 
correlation. 
Analyses of the sample at baseline were conducted using the Stata survey command (-svy-) 
accounting for cluster randomization at school level. Description of sample at baseline contains 
adjusted Wald F-statistics (design-based F) to examine individual-level variations while accounting 
for potential correlation between same-school observations. 
 
5.5 (a). Aim 1: Independent effect of intervention 
To test hypotheses for Aim 1, hierarchical regression9 with sequentially added blocks of 
variables was run on two sets of outcomes: (1) adolescent’s saving attitudes; and (2) adolescent’s 
self-reported financial asset accumulation. 
Analyses are run using generalized estimating equation (GEE) models with robust standard 
errors clustering on individual observations (xtgee command in Stata 12). Similar to multilevel 
models, GEE account for within-subject correlations among responses over time and allow for 
                                                 
9 Not to be confused with hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
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time-varying covariates. However, unlike the subject-specific multilevel models, GEEs estimate 
population-averaged treatment effects (instead of a subject-specific treatment effect). Although the 
data is clustered within schools, the number of schools is too small (n=10) to treat schools as a level. 
This decision stems from a “30/30 rule”, according to which, for estimates and their standard errors 
to be accurate, multilevel data shall comprise at least 30 groups with at least 30 cases per group 
(Hox, 2010). Therefore, in the  analyses, I treat schools as nested fixed effects.  
To test Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis1.2 (related to adolescent’s saving attitudes), GEE 
regression models are fitted based on the following set of equations: 
(1) 0 1ti i tiy X u       
(2) ' ' '
0 1 2ti i tiy X Z v         
(3)  '' '' ''0 1 2 3 4 5*ti ti i ti i i tiy X Z D T D T                
where tiy is the outcome variable for the t -th observation on the i -th subject; X  is vector of 
individual characteristics (i.e. adolescent’s age, gender, orphanhood status, level of hopelessness, 
educational plans, and educational aspirations); Z  is vector of family characteristics (i.e. family 
cohesion reported by adolescent, family cohesion reported by guardian, guardian saving for 
adolescent, guardian’s attitude to saving money, guardian’s self-reported saving, number of earners 
in the household, number of children in the household, guardian’s age and gender, and type of 
guardian); and i is school fixed effect. 
Outcomes variables are (1) What would adolescent do if she/had had money to spend? and 
(2) adolescent’s reported confidence in saving money. The correlation between the two outcome 
measures was not significant (B=-0.2; 95% CI=-0.5; 0.01; p=0.15), and, therefore, separate 
regression analyses were run on each measure (instead of multivariate regression analyses with two 
outcome variables in one model). 
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Outcome measures were regressed first on individual characteristics, as shown in equation 
(1). Then, in equation (2), family characteristics were added into the model. Finally, as shown in 
equation (3), institutional characteristics were added into the model to test the treatment effect above 
and beyond the effect of individual and family characteristics. In equation (3), 
3 refers to the average 
intervention effect ( 1tiD   
for people in the treatment group, and 0tiD   
for people in the control 
group),
 4
 is the average time effect ( 1,2,3iT  ), and 5 is the marginal intervention effect 
( * 0ti iD T   for people in treatment group, * 0ti iD T   
for people in control group, 2iT  for a 
follow-up at 12 months, and 3iT  for a follow-up at 24 months). 
The use of robust standard errors guards against most model violations. Also, as a check for 
gross assumption violations, residuals were assessed for their normality, constant variance and 
outliers. 
GEE models are non-likelihood based, and, therefore, likelihood-based inferences are not 
valid for them. In other words, goodness-of-fit tests, including the traditional Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) based on maximum likelihood estimation, and omnibus tests for analyses of 
variance cannot be obtained for GEE models. Therefore, the three models in hierarchical regression 
were compared using the modified AIC for GEEs, namely, the quasi-likelihood under independence 
model criterion, QIC. A model with the smallest QIC value has the best correlation structure, while 
a model with the smallest QICu value has the best subset of covariates and, therefore, is the best 
fitting one (Cui, 2007). The criterion was obtained separately for each of the imputed sets of data, 
and then averaged over the number of imputations (Chaurasia & Harel, 2012).  
To test Hypotheses 1.3 and Hypotheses 1.4 (related to adolescent’s self-reported financial 
asset accumulation), the estimation strategy employed the Heckman method of selection model 
47 
and inverse Mill ratio accounting for the limited dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2012), as 








   
  
 
Here, ti  is the self-reported amount saved by adolescent, and ti  is the adolescent’s 
response to the question “Do you currently have any money saved anywhere?” (Yes=1, and No=0). 
Information on the amount saved 0ti  is available only for adolescents who reported having 
money saved 1ti  . Eliminating all other cases (who reported not having any money saved 
anywhere, i.e. 0ti  ) may jeopardize the random sample property and, thus, undermine inferences. 
Therefore, the  inverse Mills ratio was calculated and incorporated into regression, following the 
three steps listed below: 
1) Probability of 1ti   was estimated through xtgee logit that was run on the outcome 
measure “self-reported saving” using the models shown in equations (1)-(3). 
2) The inverse Mills ratio, lambda, was calculated to account for the fact that only part 
of the sample has values for the “self-reported amount saved”. It is a ratio between the standard normal 
probability density function and standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
3) Lambda was included as an additional predictor into an xtgee regression run on the 
outcome measure “self-reported amount saved” using the models shown in equations (1)-(3). A 
statistically significant coefficient on lambda signified selection bias from observing the self-reported 
amount saved only for part of the sample. The selection bias is corrected by including the inverse Mills 
ratio into the regression model. 
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To verify self-reported data on savings, additional analyses were performed using 
administrative data obtained directly from the banks10. First, bivariate analyses were run to explore 
the correlation between the following pairs: 
(a) Adolescent’s self-reported saving at Wave 3 (self-reported data) and having active Child Savings 
Account, that is opening an account and depositing, at least once, an amount greater than 
zero (administrative data); and 
(b) Adolescent’s self-reported amount of money saved at Wave 3 (self-reported data) and amount saved 
in Child Savings Accounts (administrative data). 
Second, GEE regression models were run on administrative measures of savings (i.e., having 
active Child Savings Account, average monthly savings per participants in Child Savings Accounts, and frequency of 
depositing money in Child Savings Accounts) to detect individual and family characteristics significantly 
associated with these outcomes. 
 
5.5 (b). Aim 2: Moderator effect of family characteristics 
The moderating effect of family characteristics was tested separately for two sets of 
outcomes: (1) adolescent’s saving attitudes; and (2) adolescent’s self-reported financial asset 
accumulation. 
A moderator is a variable that affects the direction or strength of the relationship between an 
intervention (hereafter treatment) and an outcome. Although a moderator effect is tested through 
interaction of the treatment variable and a moderator variable (Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004; 
MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007), interaction alone does not suffice to claim a moderator effect 
in causal analyses. Two more conditions, namely: (1) temporal precedence of the moderator before 
                                                 
10 Detailed description of measures was provided earlier in this chapter (see sub-section 5.3(b) 
Outcome measures: adolescent’s financial asset accumulation) 
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the treatment, and (2) independence of the moderator from the intervention—are necessary for 
testing moderation in causal analyses (Kraemer, Kiernan, Essex, & Kupfer, 2008). 
The moderator effect of family characteristics was tested in three steps.  The first step tested 
the independence of the moderator from the treatment by fitting the model 0 1M X     , 
whereM  is the moderator at baseline and X is the intervention. The condition for temporal 
precedence of the moderator preceding the treatment holds because baseline data in Suubi-Maka 
were collected prior to random assignment into treatment and control conditions. The test was run 
on all family characteristics11 using the Stata survey command (-svy: regress- for continuous measures, 
and –svy: tab- for binary measures) accounting for cluster-randomization at the school level. Only 
variables not significantly associated with the intervention, such that 
1 0  , were selected as 
moderators. 
The second step tested simple effects of moderator variables by fitting the model 
'
0 1 2Y X M       , whereM  is a moderator at baseline, X is the treatment, and Y  is the 
outcome. At this step, the treatment variable was recoded as “+0.5” and “-0.5” to be centered 
around zero (Kraemer et al., 2008; Kraemer, Wilson, Fairburn, & Agras, 2002). This allows detecting 
2  as the simple effect of the moderator on the outcome (i.e., the effect of the moderator at 1 0X  ) 
before the assignment of the treatment. Additionally, categorical moderator variables were recoded, 
with each category being represented as a dummy variable, and continuous moderator variables were 
centered (by subtracting the sample mean). These transformations make interpretation of parameter 
                                                 
11 Family characteristics include: family cohesion reported by the adolescent, family cohesion 
reported by the guardian, the adolescent’s knowledge of the guardian saving for her/him, the 
guardian’s reported willingness to save, the guardian’s self-reported saving, the number of earners in 
the household, the number of children in the household, the guardian’s age and gender, and the type 
of guardian 
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estimates for interaction effects more meaningful, and limit multicollinearity between the predictor 
and the interaction terms (Frazier et al., 2004; Judd, McClelland, & Ryan, 2009; Rose, Holmbeck, 
Coakley, & Franks, 2004). 
Only variables significantly associated with the outcome, such that 
2 0  , were included in 
the third step, which tested interaction effects by adding two-way interaction terms into the model 
indicated at step two ( '
0 1 2 3Y X M MX         , where 3  is the moderator effect at 
1 0X   and mean value of moderator). Models in step two and step three were run using the 
generalized estimated equation method (-xtgee- command in Stata 12) to account for within-subject 
correlations of outcome values over time, with nested fixed effects for schools. 
 
5.5 (c). Aim 3: Mediator effect of adolescent’s future orientation and family financial 
socialization 
Standard approaches to mediation analyses are based on analyses that break down the 
process into causal steps, look into statistical significance of slope estimates in each of these causal 
steps, and test significance of the product of coefficients or significance of the difference in 
coefficients. Three important conditions are to be met in these analyses: (1) the effect of the 
intervention on the outcome must be significant; (2) the effect of the intervention on the mediator 
must be significant; and (3) the effect of the mediator on the outcome controlled for the 
intervention must be significant (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007; MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
A key issue with performing causal mediation analyses through structural equation modeling 
(SEM) and Baron and Kenny-type causal steps methods is the inability to conduct sensitivity 
analyses for the ignorability assumption, that is, ignorability of treatment assignment and ignorability 
of mediator assignment (Hicks & Tingley, 2011; Imai, Keele, & Tingley, 2010). In experimental 
designs (as in Suubi-Maka study), ignorability of treatment assignment holds because of random 
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assignment of schools to treatment. Ignorability of mediator assignment, however, still needs to be 
tested. 
Another issue with causal mediation analyses through structural equation modeling is the 
difficulty of extending it to non-linear models (because this approach is implemented within the 
framework of linear structural equation modeling), difficulty of obtaining odds ratios for indirect 
effects, difficulty with addressing the issue of missing data, and low power for detecting the 
mediation effect with modest sample sizes (Fritz, Taylor, & MacKinnon, 2012; Hayes, 2009; 
MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
Causal mediation analyses with longitudinal data (as in the Suubi-Maka study) allows for 
temporal precedence, which is an important condition of causality. It also allows paying attention to 
the causal structure potentially changing over time. That is, the degree to which predictors produce 
change in the outcome may not be the same over time (Cole & Maxwell, 2003). One approach to 
longitudinal mediation analyses is to fit an autoregressive model testing whether the change in 
mediator led to change in outcome (MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
To examine whether an adolescent’s future orientation and family financial socialization 
mediate the effect of intervention on the adolescent’s financial asset accumulation, analyses were 
conducted in three steps. The first step tested significance of the intervention on the mediator using 
the GEE approach, which provides appropriate standard errors which account for the correlation 
within subjects due to the repeated measures design. The main question of interest at this step was: 
whether the mediator at Wave 2 (i.e., 12-month follow up) differs significantly between the 
treatment and control group as a result of intervention. 
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The second step, also using the GEE approach, examined the effect of the mediator on the 
outcome, controlling for the intervention12. Analyses at this step were conducted only for mediators 
significantly affected by the intervention. The main question of interest at this step was: whether, 
controlling for the intervention, change in the mediator (from baseline to Wave 2) affects change in 
the outcome through the study period (that is, from baseline to Wave 2, and further to Wave 3). The 
model fitted at this stage was '
0 1 2 3( * ) ( * )Y M M T D T          , where 1 is the effect of 
change in the mediator from baseline to 12-month follow-up ( M ) on change in the outcome, 2 is 
the effect of change in the mediator on rate of change in the outcome (i.e. marginal change in the 
outcome from baseline to Wave 2, and further to Wave 3), and 3 corresponds to the intervention 
effect on outcome at 12-month follow-up ( 2T  ) and 24-month follow-up ( 3T  ). 
For mediators significantly associated with the outcome, the third step was to estimate the 
actual value of the mediation effect using the product of coefficients approach. This approach was 
adopted because it has higher power to detect effects, and smaller rate of Type I error (MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). The product of coefficients was calculated using the -
cmp- and -nlcom- commands in Stata 12. These commands, specifically -cmp-, allow estimating 
multi-equation models with hierarchical random effects, where different equations can have 
different kinds of dependent variables. Moreover, models can vary by observation, and an equation 
can be dropped for observations for which it is not relevant (Roodman, 2013). These commands 
also account for within-subject clustering of errors due to repeated-measures nature of data. To 
obtain asymmetric confidence intervals for mediated (i.e. indirect) effect, bootstrapping was 
                                                 
12 At this step, the mediator and the outcome may potentially be associated because they are both 
affected by intervention. Therefore, it is important to control for the effect of intervention 
(MacKinnon, 2008; MacKinnon et al., 2007) as well as for the effect of time. 
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conducted. It addresses the main limitation of product of coefficient approach (i.e. assumption of 
normal distribution), and is better suited for small-size samples (Fritz et al., 2012; Zhao, Lynch, & 
Chen, 2010). 
 
5.6. Statistical power 
At the stage of designing the Suubi-Maka study, power analyses were conducted for random 
coefficient models using the RMASS2 computer program to estimate the minimum detectable effect 
size for the group-by-time interaction for a continuous outcome in a two-group repeated measures 
design. Power analysis inputs included the proposed number of time points (3), number of research 
participants (300), attrition rate (10%), and variance-covariance structure of the repeated measures. 
To address clustering not only within individuals but also within schools, the effective sample size 
was adjusted by the design effect. Effect sizes found through these analyses fell between 0.20 and 
0.50, which constitute small and medium effect sizes, respectively (Cohen, 1987). This implies that 
study analyses conducted with an initial sample of 300 will be sufficiently powered to detect small to 
medium effects in data analyses including continuous outcomes. 
In this dissertation, sensitivity power analyses were conducted using G*Power 3.1.5 software 
to generate the minimum detectable effect size for each outcome measure in a two-group repeated 
measures design. The power estimates for all hypotheses were calculated using the two-tailed Type I 
error rate=0.05 and power=0.80 (Bausell, 2002). For outcome measures adolescent’s favorable attitude to 
saving, adolescent’s reported confidence in saving, and self-reported saving, sample size used for power analyses 
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was 346. For the outcome measure self-reported amount saved, sample size used for power analyses was 
161.13 
The main question of interest in these power analyses was the minimum effect size to which 
the tests were sufficiently sensitive (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). For continuous 
outcomes (i.e. adolescent’s willingness to save, adolescent’s reported confidence in saving, and self-reported amount 
saved), power analysis used procedures based on the general linear model (GLM) for conditional (or 
fixed-predictors) models of multiple regression14 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). In these 
analyses, two-tailed t-tests assess effects of a single predictor (null hypothesis: effect of a single 
predictor equals zero). The effect size measure is the proportion of variance explained by a single 
predictor. The effect size found through these analyses was 
2 0.018f  . 
For binary outcome (i.e. self-reported saving), power analyses used procedure based on 
calculation of Wald and likelihood ratio tests for a single predictor. The effect size measure is the 

















, where  1 1| 1p p Y X   under null 
hypotheses, and  2 1| 1p p Y X   under alternative hypotheses. The effect size found through 
these analyses15 was 0.58.  
                                                 
13 This measure has valid values only for participants who reported having money saved somewhere. 
At Wave 3, only 161 adolescents reported having money saved somewhere. Consequently, valid 
values for “self-reported amount saved” were available only for 161 adolescents. 
14 The fixed-predictors model is appropriate for experimental research where predictor (i.e., 
intervention) is assigned to participants by an experiment. 
15 Input:  1 1| 1 0.5p p Y X    , effect direction 2 1p p , one-tail test, and binomial   
distribution. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
 
6.1. Descriptive statistics 
6.1 (a). Description of the sample at baseline 
All adolescents in the study were AIDS-orphans, having lost their father (53.4%), mother 
(17.7%) or both parents (28.9%) to AIDS. The control group had a higher number of double-
orphans, i.e. adolescents who reported both parents not alive (design-based F(2,18) = 4.35, p<0.05). 
The mean age of adolescents, at baseline, was 13 years, ranging from 10 to 17 (the median age was 
also 13 years). Sixty-five percent of all participating adolescents were girls. On average, adolescents 
in the study had low scores on hopelessness (5 out of 20); which suggests that, despite their 
vulnerability, most adolescents in the study were still optimistic about their future. Baseline scores 
indicated that most adolescents in the study aspired to continuing their education beyond secondary 
school: going on to technical college (12.1%), to university (31.2%) or to get a second degree 
(37.3%). Along the same line, most adolescents (89.6%) reported planning to start secondary school 
after finishing their primary school (see Table 1).  
In 79.5% of cases, adolescents were cared for by a female guardian. The mean age of 
guardians in the study was 46 years, ranging from 18 to 87 (with the median age of 43). In the 
majority of cases, guardians were not biological parents: they were either grandparents (28.9% of 
cases) or other relatives (36.1% of cases), such as aunts, uncles, brothers, sisters, and cousins. In 
63.9% of cases, adolescents lived in a single-earner family with the guardian being the only source of 
financial support for the family. At baseline, 34% of all guardians reported having saved money 
somewhere. In 62.7% of cases adolescents knew that their guardian was not saving for them (see 
Table 1). 
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At baseline, 19.1% of adolescent (n=66) reported having saved money somewhere. These 
adolescents reported saving an average of Uganda shillings (UGX) 6,002 (equivalent to USD 3.30 
given the exchange rate at the time of USD 1=UGX 1,800). When asked “What would you do if you had 
10,000 Uganda shillings?”, most adolescents (65.9%) responded they would invest. Furthermore, on 
average, adolescents reported high confidence in saving (3.5 out of 4) (see Table 1). 
At baseline, there were no significant differences in adolescents' saving attitudes or self-
reported savings between the treatment and control group. In general, as shown in Table 1, the 
treatment and control groups were not significantly different at baseline, with one exception (i.e., 
orphanhood status) noted above. 
Table 1: Description of the sample at baseline 
Predictor Measures 









Individual Characteristics         
Adolescent's age (Mean; 
range: 10-17) 13 [13; 14] 13 [13; 14] 13 [13; 14] F(1,9)=0 
Female adolescent (%) 65 [57.2; 72.1] 65.4 [53; 75.9] 64.7 [54.8; 73.5] F(1,9)=0.01 
Orphanhood status (%)     
 
F(2,18)=4.35* 
Single paternal orphan 53.4 [47.1; 59.6] 57.9 [50.8; 64.6] 48.4 [40.6; 56.4] 
 Single maternal orphan 17.7 [13.7; 22.5] 19.1 [14.4; 24.9] 16.2 [10.9; 23.3] 
 Double orphan 28.9 [22.4; 36.4] 23 [18.8; 27.9]  35.4 [27.3; 44.4] 
 Beck Hopelessness Scale 
(Mean; range: 0-20) 5 [5; 6] 6 [5; 6] 5 [4; 6] F(1,9)=1.9 
Adolescent's educational 
aspirations (%)     
 
F(2, 17)=2.51 
Drop at any stage before 
completing secondary school 9.6 [6.4; 14.1] 11.7 [6.6; 20.1] 7.2 [4.2; 11.9] 
 Complete secondary school 
and stop 9.8 [6.8; 13.9] 12.9 [8.5; 18.9] 6.6 [4.8; 8.9] 
 Go on to technical college 12.1 [6.1; 22.9] 8.4 [2.2; 26.9] 16.2 [7.5; 31.6] 
 Go on to the university to get 
a degree 31.2 [24.2; 39.2] 25.1 [19.7; 31.5] 37.7 [28.9; 47.4] 
 Finish university and go on to 
graduate school to get a second 
degree 37.3 [30.2; 44.9] 41.9 [32.9; 51.4] 32.3 [25.6; 39.8] 





Not planning to start 
secondary school 10.4 [7; 15.2] 8.4 [5.6; 12.3] 12.6 [7.6; 20.1] 
 Planning to start secondary 
school 89.6 [84.8; 92.9] 91.6 [87.7; 94.4] 87.4 [79.9; 92.4] 
 Family Characteristics         
Family cohesion reported by 
adolescent (Mean; range 1-5) 3.8 [3.8; 3.9] 3.8 [3.7; 3.9] 3.8 [3.8; 3.9] F(1,9)=0.14 
Family cohesion reported by 
guardian (Mean; range 1-5) 3.8 [3.8; 3.9] 3.85 [3.8; 3.9] 3.8 [3.8; 3.9] F(1,9)=0.31 
Adolescent’s knowledge 
about guardian saving for 
her/him (%)     
 
F(2,13)=0.12 
Adolescent doesn't know 15.9 [11.4; 21.7] 16.8 [9.9; 26.9] 14.9 [10.6; 20.7] 
 Adolescent knows that 
guardian does not save 62.7 [56.2; 68.8] 62 [52.5; 70.7] 63.5 [54.6; 71.5] 
 Adolescent knows that 
guardian saves 21.4 [18.4; 24.7] 21.2 [18; 24.8] 21.6 [16.7; 27.3] 
 Guardian's reported 
willingness to save (%)     
 
F(3,25)=2.92 
Spend all of it 9.8 [7.6; 12.7] 9 [5.9; 13.4] 10.8 [7.7; 14.8] 
 Spend most of it 5.2 [2.7; 9.7] 5 [1.8; 13.5] 5.4 [2.5; 11.3] 
 Spend half, save half 24.3 [17.4; 32.8] 29.6 [24.7; 35]  18.6 [9.4; 33.3] 
 Save most of it 4.1 [2.1; 7.5] 5.6 [2.7; 11.3] 2.4 [1; 5.6] 
 Save all of it 4.3 [2.5; 7.5] 6.7 [5.3; 8.5] 1.8 [0.5; 6.4]  
 Buy a cow, goat, or other 
animal that would eventually bring 
money 52.3 [42.2; 62.3] 44.1 [38.4; 50] 61 [47.3; 3.3]  
 Guardian reports saving 
(Yes, %) 34 [24.2; 45.7] 40 [23.6; 58.3] 28.1 [22.7; 34.3] F(1,9)=2.12 
Single-earner family (%) 63.9 [59; 68.5] 64.3 [58.5; 69.6] 63.5 [55.6; 70.7] F(1,9)=0.04 
Number of children in the 
household (Mean; range: 0-9) 3 [3; 4] 3 [3; 4] 3 [3; 4] F(1,9)=0.23 
Guardian's age (Mean; range: 
18-87) 46 [43; 49] 44 [39; 49] 48 [47; 49] F(1,9)=2.26 
Female guardian (%) 79.5 [69.5; 86.8] 77.7 [64.5; 86.9] 81.4 [65.5; 91] F(1,9)=0.25 
Type of guardian (%)     
 
F(2,15)=3.32 
Parents 35.3 [27.81,43.5] 40.2 [30.7; 50.6] 30 [21.8; 39.5] 




[30.61,42.04] 38.6 [31; 46.7] 33.5 [26.2; 41.7] 
 Outcome measures         
Whether adolescent reports 
having money saved 
somewhere? (%, YES) 19.1 [12.7; 27.7] 20.1 [14.1; 27.8] 18 [8.2; 35.1] F(1,9)=0.1 
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(a) Reported amount saved (in 
Uganda shillings) (Mean; 






[4,915; 9,897] F(1,9)=0.3 
What would adolescent do if 
she/he had 10,000 Uganda 
shillings?     
 
F(2,17)=1.84 
Spend 6.4 [2.3; 16.3] 10.1 [3.4; 26.3] 2.4 [1.04; 5.4] 
 Spend half, save half 16.2 [11; 23.2] 17.9 [9.1; 32.1] 14.4 [11.2; 18.3] 
 Save 11.5 [6.1; 20.8] 12.8 [4.8; 30] 10.2 [5.2; 19.1] 
 Invest 65.9 [52; 77.5] 59.2 [37.5; 77.8] 73 [62.2; 81.7] 
 Adolescent's confidence in 
saving (Mean, range: 1-4) 3.5 [3.4; 3.5] 3.4 [3.3; 3.5] 3.5 [3.4; 3.6] F(1,9)=2.85 
*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001. Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(a) Applies to adolescents who answered "Yes" to question "Do you currently have any money saved anywhere" 
(n=66). This is a log-transformed version of the original variable. 
 
6.1 (b). Description of savings in Child Savings Accounts 
By the study design, administrative savings data from matched savings accounts offered by 
the intervention was available only for the treatment group—comprising children who opened up 
accounts with the study partnering banks: Centenary Rural Development Bank, DFCU 
(Development Finance Company of Uganda) Bank, and Kakuuto Microfinance. 
Out of 179 adolescents enrolled in the treatment group and offered a chance to save 66% 
(n=118) opened Child Savings Accounts (CSA) and deposited money as a result of participation in 
the study. In other cases, accounts were opened but never activated (7.8%) or accounts were opened 
but had no deposits made throughout the 2-year intervention period16 (7.8%). In 18.4% of cases 
(n=33) accounts were never opened. 
In 118 CSA, each participant saved an average of UGX 5,477 per month (an equivalent of 
USD 3.04). In the lower quartile, participants saved an average of UGX 1,053 (USD 0.59). In the 
upper quartile, the average amount saved was UGX 7,383 (USD 4.1).  The average frequency of 
                                                 
16 No deposits were made on these accounts beyond the opening amount provided by the project. 
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depositing equaled to 0.29, that is, participants deposited 29% of time when the account was 
opened. 
 









Opening Child Savings Accounts (%)   
  Opened, activated, and deposited 118 66 [41.5; 84.1] 
Opened, activated, but never deposited 14 7.8 [5.1; 11.9] 
Opened, but never activated 14 7.8 [1; 43.6] 
Did not open 33 18.4 [5.6; 46.1] 
Average number of month account was open 
(Mean, range: 9-20) 146 17.8 [16; 19.6] 
Frequency of depositing (% of time account was open) 118 29 [18; 40] 
Average amount saved (Mean, range: 100-38,160) 118 5,477 [2,437; 8,516] 
Lower quartile (25% percentile)   1,053 [883; 1655] 
Upper quartile (75% percentile)   7,383 [5,263; 11,510] 
Note: Administrative data from banks. Available for treatment group only. 
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6.2. Aim 1. Independent effect of intervention 
In this section, hierarchical regressions17 with sequentially added blocks of variables 
examined whether the intervention affected adolescents’ saving attitudes and financial asset 
accumulation above and beyond the individual and family characteristics. Each outcome measure was 
sequentially regressed on three blocks of predictors, with nested fixed effects for schools. Step one 
added the block of individual characteristics (Model 1), step two added the block of family 
characteristics (Model 2), and step three included the intervention measure, in addition to individual 
and family characteristics (Model 3). Tables 3-4 present results of generalized estimating equation 
regressions for adolescents' saving attitudes (Table 3.1. and Table 3.2.) and adolescents' financial 
asset accumulation (Table 4.1. and Table 4.2.), using the imputed datasets.  
 
6.2 (a). Adolescents' saving attitudes 
Tables 3.1.and 3.2. illustrate results of hierarchical regressions for adolescents' willingness to save 
and adolescents' reported confidence in saving respectively. 
As indicated in Model 1, several individual characteristics were significantly associated with 
both adolescents' willingness to save (Table 3.1.) and adolescents' reported confidence in saving (Table 3.2.). 
Older adolescents (B=0.05; 95% CI=0.03, 0.1) and adolescents with higher educational aspirations 
(B=0.09; 95% CI=0.03, 0.1) reported higher willingness to save, compared with younger adolescents 
and adolescents with lower educational aspirations (Table 3.1.). Female adolescents reported feeling 
less confident in saving money (B=-0.11; 95% CI=-0.2, -0.02) than their male counterparts (Table 
3.2.). Adolescents with lower scores of hopelessness reported feeling more confident in saving 
money (B=-0.01; 95% CI=-0.02, -0.002) than adolescents with higher scores of hopeless (Table 
                                                 
17 Not to be confused with hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
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3.2.). With the exception of the Beck Hopelessness Scale, significance of these individual 
characteristics held after adding a block of family characteristics (Model 2). 
Considering the effect of family characteristics (Model 2), results (Table 3.1.) indicate a 
positive significant association between the guardian’s willingness to save and the adolescent’s 
willingness to save (B=0.05; 95% CI=0.02, 0.1). Also, adolescents cared for by female guardians 
reported being less willing to save (B=-0.23; 95% CI=-0.4, -0.1) than adolescents cared for by male 
guardians (Table 3.1.). Furthermore, adolescents reporting greater family cohesion also reported 
greater confidence in saving money (B=0.2; 95% CI=0.1, 0.3)(Table 3.2.). Additionally, adolescents 
who knew their guardians saved for them reported greater confidence in saving money (B=0.24; 
95% CI=0.1, 0.4), compared with adolescents who did not know whether their guardians saved for 
them (Table 3.2). 
After adding institutional characteristics (Model 3), an adolescent’s age was no longer a 
significant predictor of her/his saving attitudes; but the adolescent’s educational aspirations (Table 
3.1.) and gender (Table 3.2.) remained statistically significant. All family characteristics significantly 
associated with the adolescent’s saving attitudes in Model 2 remained significant in Model 3. 
Additionally, in Model 3 (Table 3.1.), adolescents whose guardians reported having saved money 
reported being less willing to save (B=-0.15; 95% CI=-0.3, -0.01) than adolescents whose guardians 
reported not having saved money. The intervention had no significant effect on adolescents saving 
attitudes above and beyond the individual and family characteristics. 
For both adolescents' reported willingness to save (Table 3.1.) and reported confidence in saving (Table 
3.2.), Model 3 has the lowest value of QICu, and, therefore is the best fitting model. These findings 
suggest that adolescents’ saving attitudes are best predicted by models that include institutional 





Table 3.1. Linear hierarchical regression with blocks of variables: reported willingness to save 
 
VARIABLES 










Individual Characteristics   
Adolescent's age 0.05* [0.001 - 0.1] 0.06* [0.002 - 0.1] 0.03 [-0.0 - 0.1] 
Female adolescent -0.03 [-0.2 - 0.1] -0.00 [-0.2 - 0.2] -0.01 [-0.2 - 0.1] 
Single paternal orphan 0.09 [-0.1 - 0.2] 0.15 [-0.0 - 0.3] 0.14 [-0.0 - 0.3] 
Single maternal orphan 0.08 [-0.1 - 0.3] 0.04 [-0.2 - 0.3] 0.02 [-0.2 - 0.2] 
Beck Hopelessness Scale -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Adolescent's educational aspirations 0.09** [0.02 - 0.1] 0.1** [0.03 - 0.2] 0.1** [0.04 - 0.2] 
Planning to start secondary school -0.10 [-0.3 - 0.1] -0.05 [-0.3 - 0.2] -0.07 [-0.3 - 0.2] 
Family Characteristics   
Family cohesion reported by adolescent   
 
-0.08 [-0.2 - 0.1] -0.08 [-0.2 - 0.1] 
Family cohesion reported by guardian   
 
-0.02 [-0.2 - 0.1] -0.03 [-0.2 - 0.1] 
Adolescent knows that guardian does not save 
for her/him   
 
0.01 [-0.2 - 0.2] 0.00 [-0.2 - 0.2] 
Adolescent knows that guardian saves for 
her/him   
 
-0.08 [-0.3 - 0.1] -0.08 [-0.3 - 0.1] 
Guardian's reported willingness to save 
  
0.05** [0.02 - 0.1] 0.05** [0.02 - 0.1] 
Guardian reports saving 
  
-0.13 [-0.3 - 0.0] -0.15* [-0.3 - -0.01] 
Single-earner family 
  
0.01 [-0.1 - 0.2] 0.02 [-0.1 - 0.2] 
Number of children in the household 
  
0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Guardian's age 
  
0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Female guardian 
  
-0.23* [-0.4 - -0.1] -0.24** [-0.4 - -0.1] 
Type of guardian: grandparent 
  





Type of guardian: Other relatives 
  
0.06 [-0.1 - 0.2] 0.07 [-0.1 - 0.3] 
Intervention   
Average group effect (treatment vs. control 
group) 
    
0.05 [-0.3 - 0.4] 
Average time effect at Wave 2 (12-month 
follow up) 
    
0.08 [-0.1 - 0.3] 
Average time effect at Wave 3 (24-month 
follow up) 
    
0.05 [-0.2 - 0.3] 
Marginal intervention effect at Wave 2 
    
-0.13 [-0.4 - 0.2] 
Marginal intervention effect at Wave 3 
    
0.20 [-0.2 - 0.6] 
School fixed effects   
School 1 -0.65** [-1.1 - -0.2] -0.68** [-1.1 - -0.3] -0.72** [-1.2 - -0.3] 
School 2 -0.17 [-0.4 - 0.0] -0.12 [-0.3 - 0.1] -0.17 [-0.4 - 0.1] 
School 3 -0.23 [-0.5 - 0.0] -0.17 [-0.4 - 0.1] -0.21 [-0.5 - 0.0] 
School 4 0.14 [-0.1 - 0.4] 0.12 [-0.1 - 0.4] 0.09 [-0.2 - 0.4] 
School 6 0.27* [0.1 - 0.5] 0.24* [0.02 - 0.5] 0.26 [-0.0 - 0.6] 
School 7 0.13 [-0.1 - 0.4] 0.09 [-0.2 - 0.4] 0.11 [-0.2 - 0.5] 
School 8 0.22 [-0.1 - 0.5] 0.14 [-0.2 - 0.4] 0.17 [-0.2 - 0.5] 
School 9 0.16 [-0.1 - 0.4] 0.14 [-0.1 - 0.4] 0.19 [-0.1 - 0.5] 











 Wald test (a) F(15,57968.1)= 3.43*** F(27,81274.0)=3.08***  F(32,70980.1)=2.97*** 
Information criterion (QICu) 836.97 801.52 793.45 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(a) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero 
  






Table 3.2. Linear hierarchical regression with blocks of variables: reported confidence in saving money 
 
VARIABLES 










Individual Characteristics   
Adolescent's age 0.02 [-0.0 - 0.0] 0.02 [-0.0 - 0.0] 0.02 [-0.0 - 0.1] 
Female adolescent -0.11* [-0.2 - -0.02] -0.12** [-0.2 - -0.04] -0.11* [-0.2 - -0.03] 
Single paternal orphan -0.02 [-0.1 - 0.1] -0.04 [-0.1 - 0.1] -0.03 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Single maternal orphan 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 0.02 [-0.1 - 0.1] 0.02 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Beck Hopelessness Scale -0.01* [-0.02 - -0.002] -0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Adolescent's educational aspirations -0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Planning to start secondary school 0.00 [-0.1 - 0.2] -0.02 [-0.2 - 0.1] -0.02 [-0.2 - 0.1] 
Family Characteristics   
Family cohesion reported by adolescent 
  
0.2*** [0.1 - 0.3] 0.19*** [0.1 - 0.3] 
Family cohesion reported by guardian 
  
0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Adolescent knows that guardian does not save 
for her/him 
  
0.09 [-0.0 - 0.2] 0.10 [-0.0 - 0.2] 
Adolescent knows that guardian saves for 
her/him 
  
0.24*** [0.1 - 0.4] 0.20*** [0.1 - 0.3] 
Guardian's reported willingness to save 
  
-0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Guardian reports saving 
  
-0.03 [-0.1 - 0.1] -0.03 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Single-earner family 
  
-0.06 [-0.1 - 0.0] -0.05 [-0.1 - 0.0] 
Number of children in the household 
  
-0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Guardian's age 
  
-0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Female guardian 
  
-0.02 [-0.1 - 0.1] -0.03 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Type of guardian: grandparent 
  





Type of guardian: Other relatives 
  
0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Intervention   
Average group effect (treatment vs. control 
group)     
  
-0.16 [-0.3 - 0.0] 
Average time effect at Wave 2 (12-month 
follow up)   
   
0.15** [0.04 - 0.3] 
Average time effect at Wave 3 (24-month 
follow up)   
   
-0.05 [-0.2 - 0.1] 
Marginal intervention effect at Wave 2   
   
0.06 [-0.1 - 0.2] 
Marginal intervention effect at Wave 3   
   
0.09 [-0.1 - 0.2] 
School fixed effects   
School 1 -0.06 [-0.3 - 0.2] -0.08 [-0.4 - 0.2] -0.06 [-0.3 - 0.2] 
School 2 -0.19** [-0.3 - -0.1] -0.20** [-0.3 - -0.1] -0.17* [-0.3 - -0.03] 
School 3 -0.10 [-0.2 - 0.0] -0.16* [-0.3 - -0.03] -0.12 [-0.3 - 0.0] 
School 4 -0.21* [-0.4 - -0.03] -0.20* [-0.4 - -0.01] -0.16 [-0.3 - 0.0] 
School 6 -0.13 [-0.3 - 0.1] -0.13 [-0.3 - 0.1] -0.21 [-0.4 - 0.0] 
School 7 -0.04 [-0.2 - 0.1] -0.00 [-0.1 - 0.1] -0.10 [-0.3 - 0.1] 
School 8 -0.16 [-0.4 - 0.0] -0.18 [-0.4 - 0.0] -0.26* [-0.5 - -0.02] 
School 9 -0.00 [-0.1 - 0.1] -0.00 [-0.1 - 0.1] -0.08 [-0.2 - 0.1] 











 Wald test (b) F(15,172398.8)=2* F( 27,203865.1)=3.65*** F(32,236986.0)= 4.74*** 
Information criterion (QICu) 285.38 264.73 256.44 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(a) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero 
  
A model with the smallest value of QICu is the best fitting model. 
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6.2 (b). Adolescent’s financial asset accumulation 
Results of hierarchical regressions on adolescent’s self-reported saving and self-reported amount 
saved are described in Table 4.1. and Table 4.2., respectively. As described earlier, each outcome 
measure was sequentially regressed on three blocks of predictors—individual characteristics (Model 
1), family characteristics (Model 2), and institutional characteristics (Model 3)—with nested fixed 
effects for schools. 
Results for Model 1—shown in Table 4.1. and Table 4.2.—indicate that older adolescents 
were more likely to report having saved money (odds ratio=1.35; 95% CI = 1.19, 1.53), and they 
reported saving more (B=0.83; 95% CI=0.34, 1.31) than their younger counterparts. Female 
adolescents were less likely to report having saved money (odds ratio=0.48; 95% CI = 0.33, 0.7), and 
they reported saving less (B=-1.84; 95% CI=-3.01, -0.67) than their male counterparts. Similarly, 
adolescents with higher scores on the Beck Hopelessness Scale were less likely to report having 
saved money (odds ratio=0.93; 95% CI = 0.88, 0.99), and they reported saving less (B=-0.18; 95% 
CI=-0.3, -0.06) than adolescents with lower scores on the Beck Hopelessness Scale. Also, 
participants who planned to start secondary school saved less (B=-1.03; 95% CI=-1.6, -0.46) than 
adolescents who did not plan to start secondary school. 
After adding block of family characteristics (Model 2), Beck Hopelessness Scale was no 
longer a significant predictor of self-reported saving; while adolescent’s age and gender remained 
significant (Table 4.1.). For self-reported amount saved, all individual characteristics significant in Model 









Table 1.1. Logistic hierarchical regression with blocks of variables: self-reported saving 
 
VARIABLES 










Individual Characteristics   
Adolescent's age 1.35*** [1.19 - 1.53] 1.33*** [1.17 - 1.51] 1.02 [0.87 - 1.19] 
Female adolescent 0.48*** [0.33 - 0.7] 0.49*** [0.33 - 0.72] 0.45*** [0.3 - 0.67] 
Single paternal orphan 1.42 [0.93 - 2.16] 1.44 [0.89 - 2.34] 1.45 [0.90 - 2.36] 
Single maternal orphan 1.32 [0.75 - 2.33] 1.17 [0.60 - 2.29] 1.10 [0.56 - 2.16] 
Beck Hopelessness Scale 0.93* [0.88 - 0.99] 0.96 [0.91 - 1.02] 1.00 [0.95 - 1.07] 
Adolescent's educational aspirations 1.05 [0.92 - 1.19] 1.02 [0.89 - 1.17] 1.03 [0.89 - 1.20] 
Planning to start secondary school 0.77 [0.41 - 1.43] 0.68 [0.35 - 1.31] 0.63 [0.32 - 1.21] 
Family Characteristics   
Family cohesion reported by adolescent     1.13 [0.79 - 1.61] 1.19 [0.82 - 1.72] 
Family cohesion reported by guardian   
 
0.93 [0.63 - 1.38] 0.84 [0.56 - 1.26] 
Adolescent knows that guardian does not save for 
her/him   
 
0.44*** [0.29 - 0.67] 0.43*** [0.27 - 0.68] 
Adolescent knows that guardian saves for her/him   
 
1.19 [0.75 - 1.87] 1.03 [0.63 - 1.66] 
Guardian's reported willingness to save   
 
0.96 [0.88 - 1.04] 0.97 [0.90 - 1.06] 
Guardian reports saving   
 
1.59* [1.12 - 2.27] 1.32 [0.92 - 1.88] 
Single-earner family   
 
0.90 [0.65 - 1.25] 0.89 [0.64 - 1.24] 
Number of children in the household   
 
0.94 [0.85 - 1.03] 0.96 [0.87 - 1.06] 
Guardian's age   
 
1.00 [0.99 - 1.02] 1.00 [0.98 - 1.02] 
Female guardian   
 
0.85 [0.51 - 1.42] 0.83 [0.50 - 1.37] 
Type of guardian: grandparent   
 
1.46 [0.78 - 2.71] 1.67 [0.88 - 3.14] 
Type of guardian: Other relatives     1.01 [0.63 - 1.63] 1.18 [0.74 - 1.90] 





Average group effect (treatment vs. control group)     
  
2.02 [0.69 - 5.94] 
Average time effect at Wave 2 (12-month follow up)   
   
1.41 [0.84 - 2.38] 
Average time effect at Wave 3 (24-month follow up)   
   
2.63** [1.40 - 4.92] 
Marginal intervention effect at Wave 2   
   
2.05* [1.02 - 4.14] 
Marginal intervention effect at Wave 3   
   
2.32* [1.08 - 5.02] 
School fixed effects   
School 1 1.15 [0.52 - 2.55] 0.94 [0.41 - 2.15] 0.53 [0.21 - 1.36] 
School 2 1.09 [0.63 - 1.88] 1.06 [0.60 - 1.87] 0.61 [0.32 - 1.18] 
School 3 1.61 [0.92 - 2.83] 1.24 [0.67 - 2.29] 0.77 [0.39 - 1.52] 
School 4 1.13 [0.57 - 2.24] 0.93 [0.45 - 1.90] 0.72 [0.31 - 1.65] 
School 6 0.51 [0.26 - 1.01] 0.49* [0.25 - 0.99] 0.87 [0.32 - 2.37] 
School 7 1.64 [0.81 - 3.33] 1.89 [0.88 - 4.06] 3.58* [1.21 - 10.58] 
School 8 1.09 [0.45 - 2.61] 0.91 [0.36 - 2.33] 1.72 [0.53 - 5.59] 
School 9 0.24*** [0.11 - 0.51] 0.25*** [0.11 - 0.56] 0.60 [0.20 - 1.79] 
Constant 0.01*** [0.00 - 0.12] 0.02* [0.00 - 0.56] 0.38 [0.01 - 12.58] 
Observations 980 967 967 
Number of adolescent ID 344 343 343 
Wald test (a) 
F(  
15,174367.2)=6.06*** 




Information criterion (QICu) 1153.71 1063.69 1013.79 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(a) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero 







Table 4.2. Linear hierarchical regression with blocks of variables: self-reported amount saved (LOG) 
 
VARIABLES 










Individual Characteristics   
Adolescent's age 0.83*** [0.34 - 1.31] 0.52*** [0.27 - 0.76] 0.23*** [0.1 - 0.35] 
Female adolescent -1.84** [-3.01 - -0.67] -1.20*** [-1.81 - -0.58] -0.85** [-1.49 - -0.22] 
Single paternal orphan 0.62 [-0.02 - 1.26] 0.28 [-0.23 - 0.79] 0.08 [-0.40 - 0.56] 
Single maternal orphan 0.53 [-0.13 - 1.19] 0.02 [-0.49 - 0.52] -0.07 [-0.58 - 0.44] 
Beck Hopelessness Scale -0.18** [-0.3 - -0.06] -0.09** [-0.15 - -0.03] -0.04 [-0.09 - 0.00] 
Adolescent's educational aspirations 0.11 [-0.03 - 0.26] 0.05 [-0.07 - 0.18] 0.08 [-0.04 - 0.20] 
Planning to start secondary school -1.03*** [-1.6 - -0.46] -0.89*** [-1.39 - -0.39] -0.62* [-1.18 - -0.06] 
Family Characteristics   
Family cohesion reported by adolescent     -0.02 [-0.30 - 0.27] -0.05 [-0.34 - 0.25] 
Family cohesion reported by guardian   
 
0.24 [-0.08 - 0.56] 0.24 [-0.09 - 0.57] 
Adolescent knows that guardian does not 
save for her/him   
 
-0.68 [-1.43 - 0.07] -0.24 [-0.93 - 0.45] 
Adolescent knows that guardian saves for 
her/him   
 
0.41* [0.01 - 0.8] 0.25 [-0.13 - 0.63] 
Guardian's reported willingness to save   
 
-0.10* [-0.18 - -0.01] -0.06 [-0.15 - 0.02] 
Guardian reports saving   
 
0.10 [-0.36 - 0.56] -0.28 [-0.61 - 0.06] 
Single-earner family   
 
-0.17 [-0.47 - 0.14] -0.10 [-0.41 - 0.20] 
Number of children in the household   
 
-0.05 [-0.13 - 0.03] 0.01 [-0.06 - 0.08] 
Guardian's age   
 
-0.00 [-0.02 - 0.02] -0.01 [-0.03 - 0.01] 
Female guardian   
 
-0.40* [-0.74 - -0.05] -0.35 [-0.72 - 0.02] 
Type of guardian: grandparent   
 
0.48 [-0.08 - 1.05] 0.42 [-0.16 - 0.99] 
Type of guardian: Other relatives     -0.10 [-0.49 - 0.29] -0.07 [-0.46 - 0.31] 
Intervention   
Average group effect (treatment vs. control     
  






Average time effect at Wave 2 (12-month 
follow up)   
   
0.13 [-0.39 - 0.65] 
Average time effect at Wave 3 (24-month 
follow up)   
   
0.14 [-0.72 - 0.99] 
Marginal intervention effect at Wave 2   
   
0.15 [-0.65 - 0.94] 
Marginal intervention effect at Wave 3   
   
0.93* [0.18 - 1.68] 
School fixed effects   
School 1 0.21 [-0.52 - 0.93] -0.18 [-0.94 - 0.59] -0.38 [-1.24 - 0.48] 
School 2 0.43 [-0.01 - 0.87] 0.39 [-0.05 - 0.82] 0.03 [-0.50 - 0.56] 
School 3 1.11** [0.28 - 1.95] 0.37 [-0.13 - 0.86] 0.01 [-0.54 - 0.56] 
School 4 0.63 [-0.13 - 1.39] 0.30 [-0.40 - 0.99] 0.20 [-0.54 - 0.94] 
School 6 -1.54* [-2.72 - -0.37] -0.78 [-1.59 - 0.02] -0.06 [-0.85 - 0.73] 
School 7 1.03* [0.17 - 1.89] 0.71* [0.08 - 1.34] 0.64 [-0.50 - 1.77] 
School 8 -0.42 [-0.94 - 0.10] -0.80** [-1.37 - -0.22] -0.46 [-1.36 - 0.44] 
School 9 -3.81** [-6.42 - -1.20] -1.94* [-3.43 - -0.45] -0.42 [-1.43 - 0.60] 











 Mill's lambda 2.67* [0.40 - 4.94] 1.26* [0.12 - 2.40] 0.39 [-0.65 - 1.44] 
Wald test (a) F(16, ∞)= 5.90***  F(28, ∞)= 4.51*** F(33, ∞) = 4.61*** 
Information criterion (QICu) 360.09 337.73 332.32 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(a) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero. The individual or model residual degrees of freedom is 
reported to be missing.  This may happen when the estimated (average) relative variance increase due to nonresponse is close enough to 
zero (low fraction of missings) such that the degrees of freedom approaches infinity.  In this case, the normal distribution is used to 
compute the significance levels of the reported t tests and the chi-squared distribution is used to compute the significance level of the F 
test (Source: Stata (2012). Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual) 
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Four family characteristics— guardian saving for adolescent, guardian’s self-reported saving, 
guardian’s attitude to saving money, and guardian’s gender—were significantly associated with 
adolescent’s financial asset accumulation. In particular, compared with adolescents who didn’t know 
if their guardians saved for them, adolescents who knew their guardians were not saving for them 
were less likely to report having saved money (odds ratio=0.44; 95% CI = 0.29, 0.67) (Table 4.1.). 
Compared with the same group (i.e., adolescents who didn’t know if their guardians saved for them), 
adolescents who knew their guardians were saving for them reported saving more (B=0.41 95% 
CI=0.01, 0.8) (Table 4.2.). Furthermore, adolescents whose guardians reported having saved money 
were more likely to report saving themselves (odds ratio=1.59; 95% CI = 1.12, 2.27) than 
adolescents whose guardians reported not having saved money (Table 4.1.). Adolescents whose 
guardians had higher willingness to save reported saving less (B=-0.1; 95% CI=-0.18, -0.01) than 
adolescents whose guardians were less willing to save (Table 4.2.). Similarly, adolescents cared for by 
female guardians reported saving less (B=-0.4; 95% CI=-0.74, -0.05) than adolescents cared for by 
male guardians (Table 4.2.). 
After adding block of institutional characteristics (Model 3), none of the family 
characteristics remained significantly associated with adolescent’s self-reported amount saved. Meanwhile, 
adolescent’s individual characteristics, specifically, age (B=0.23 95% CI=0.1, 0.35), gender (B=-0.85 
95% CI=-1.49, -0.22), and educational plans (B=-0.62 95% CI=-1.18, -0.06) remained significant 
(Table 4.2.). For self-reported saving (Table 4.1.), only adolescent’s gender (odds ratio=0.45; 95% CI = 
0.3, 0.67) and guardian saving for adolescent (odds ratio=0.43; 95% CI = 0.27, 0.68) remained 
significant in Model 3. 
The intervention effect was significant at Wave 3 for both measures of financial asset 
accumulation. That is, controlling for individual and family characteristics, at Wave 3, adolescents in 
the treatment group were more likely to report having money saved (odds ratio=2.32; 95% CI = 
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1.08, 5.02), and they reported saving greater amounts, compared with adolescents in the control 
group (B=0.93; 95% CI=0.18, 1.68). Additionally, the intervention effect was significant at Wave 2 
for the self-reported saving (Table 4.1.). That is, controlling for individual and family characteristics, at 
12-month follow-up, adolescents in the treatment group were more likely to report having money 
saved (odds ratio=2.05; 95% CI = 1.02, 4.14) than adolescents in the control group. 
The statistically significant coefficient for Mill’s lambda in Model 1 ( =2.67, 95% CI=0.4, 
4.94; p<0.05) and Model 2 ( =1.26, 95% CI=0.12, 2.4; p<0.05) indicates selection bias from 
observing the self-reported amount saved only on the part of sample that reported having saved money. 
The selection bias, however, was corrected by including the inverse Mill’s ratio into the regression 
model. 
For both the self-reported saving (Table 4.1.) and the self-reported amount saved (Table 4.2.) Model 
3 has the lowest value of QICu, thus being the best fitting model. These findings imply that 
adolescent’s financial asset accumulation is best predicted by a model that include not only 
individual and family characteristics, but also the institutional ones. 
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6.3. Aim 2. Moderator effect of family characteristics 
The first step in estimating the moderator effect of family characteristics was to test whether 
these measures at baseline were significantly different between the treatment and control group.  
Table 2. Association between moderators and intervention variable 
 
Moderators at Wave 1 F (1, 7.5) P-value 
Family relations 
Family cohesion reported by adolescent 0.14 0.71 
Family cohesion reported by guardian 0.31 0.59 
Family financial socialization 
Adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him 0.20 0.67 
Guardian's reported willingness to save 2.53 0.15 
Guardian's self-reported saving 2.11 0.19 
Household demographics 
Number of earners in the family 0.03 0.86 
Number of children in the household 0.23 0.65 
Guardian's age 2.26 0.17 
Type of guardian 0.36 0.57 
Guardian's gender 0.25 0.63 
*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001. Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
 
Results—shown in Table 5—indicate that all family characteristics at baseline were 
independent from the intervention. In other words, there were no significant differences in family 
characteristics at baseline between the treatment and control groups. Therefore, all family 
characteristics were tested as potential moderators in the next step. 
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6.3 (a). Adolescents' saving attitudes 
Although the intervention effect on adolescents’ saving attitudes was found to be non-
significant18, these findings refer to the effect of the intervention on the total sample. However, the 
effect of intervention, non-significant for the total sample, may, potentially, be significant for a 
specific sub-set of sample, defined by one or more moderators. This may happen when the 
moderator amplifies or reverses the intervention effect (Frazier et al., 2004; Hayes, 2009; Kraemer et 
al., 2008). Therefore, analyses test for moderator effects of family characteristics even though no 
intervention effect was found on adolescents' savings attitudes for the total sample. 
As explained in Chapter 5: Methods, at this step, the treatment variable was recoded as “+0.5” 
and “-0.5” to be centered around zero. Additionally, categorical moderator variables were recoded, 
each category being represented as a dummy variable, and continuous moderator variables were 
centered (by subtracting the sample mean). These transformations allow interpreting the regression 
coefficient representing relationships between the moderator and the outcome variable as a simple 
effect of the moderator variable. That is, the effect of the moderator on the outcome at the value of 
the other variables in the model being zero (Frazier et al., 2004; Kraemer et al., 2008). 
As shown in Table 6.1., adolescent’s knowledge that guardian saves for her/him and family cohesion 
reported by adolescents had significant simple effects on adolescents' saving attitudes. In other words, 
controlling for the treatment assignment and for the other moderators, adolescents who knew their 
guardians saved for them reported higher willingness to save (B=0.23; 95% CI=0.02, 0.4), compared 
with adolescents who did not know if their guardians saved for them. Also, controlling for the 
treatment assignment and for the other moderators, adolescents reporting higher family cohesion 
also reported higher confidence in saving money (B=0.18; 95% CI=0.1, 0.3).  
                                                 
18 Described earlier in this chapter (see sub-section 6.2(a). Adolescent’s saving attitudes) 
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in saving money 
B coef 95% CI B coef 95% CI 
Intervention effect (treatment vs. control 
group) 0.01 [-0.3 - 0.3] -0.08 [-0.2 - 0.1] 
Simple effect of moderators 
    Family cohesion reported by adolescent -0.12 [-0.2 - 0.0] 0.18*** [0.1 - 0.3] 
Family cohesion reported by guardian 0.02 [-0.1 - 0.2] 0.02 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Adolescent knows that guardian does not save 
for her/him 0.15 [-0.0 - 0.3] -0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Adolescent knows that guardian saves for 
her/him 0.23* [0.02 - 0.4] 0.05 [-0.1 - 0.2] 
Guardian's reported willingness to save 0.03 [-0.0 - 0.1] -0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Guardian reports saving -0.05 [-0.2 - 0.1] 0.04 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Single-earner family 0.09 [-0.1 - 0.2] 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Number of children in the household -0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] 0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Guardian's age 0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Female guardian -0.13 [-0.3 - 0.0] -0.02 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Type of guardian: grandparent -0.01 [-0.2 - 0.2] -0.02 [-0.2 - 0.1] 
Type of guardian: Other relatives 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.2] -0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
School fixed effects 
    School 1 -0.73*** [-1.1 - -0.3] -0.11 [-0.4 - 0.2] 
School 2 -0.08 [-0.3 - 0.2] -0.22** [-0.4 - -0.1] 
School 3 -0.15 [-0.4 - 0.1] -0.13 [-0.3 - 0.0] 
School 4 0.16 [-0.1 - 0.4] -0.17 [-0.4 - 0.0] 
School 6 0.23 [-0.1 - 0.5] -0.20* [-0.4 - -0.01] 
School 7 0.03 [-0.3 - 0.4] -0.10 [-0.3 - 0.1] 
School 8 0.17 [-0.2 - 0.5] -0.26* [-0.5 - -0.04] 
School 9 0.19 [-0.1 - 0.5] -0.11 [-0.2 - 0.0] 
Constant (average value for fixed effects) 3.30*** [3.0 - 3.6] 3.69*** [3.5 - 3.9] 
Number of observations 1011 1012 
Number of child ID 344 344 
Wald test (a) 




*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(a) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero 
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As detailed in the methods chapter19, only family characteristics significantly associated with 
outcome measures were further tested for interaction effects. Table 6.2. illustrates results of these 
tests for adolescent’s knowledge that guardian saves for her/him and family cohesion reported by adolescents 
respectively. 
Despite having a simple effect on the outcome, as mentioned above, an adolescent’s baseline 
knowledge that the guardian saved for her/him did not change the effect of the intervention on the 
adolescent’s reported willingness to save. Additionally, results suggest that, in both the treatment and the 
control group, the adolescent’s reported willingness to save had improved at 24-month follow-up for 
adolescents who at baseline knew that guardians saved for them (B=0.36; 95% CI=0.04, 0.7; 
F(1,91032.2)= 4.80, p<0.05). 
Similarly, despite having a simple effect on the outcome, family cohesion reported by 
adolescents did not change the effect of the intervention on adolescents' reported confidence in saving 
money. In the meantime, results show that adolescents' reported confidence in saving money, on average, 
had increased from baseline to 12-month follow-up (B=0.26; 95% CI=0.2, 0.3) in both the 
treatment and the control groups, with increase being more pronounced for adolescents who at 
baseline reported lower level of family cohesion (B=-0.21; 95% CI=-0.4, -0.05; F(1,91032.2)= 4.80, 
p<0.05). 
  
                                                 
19 See Chapter 5: Methods. 
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in saving money 
B coef 95% CI B coef 95% CI 
Average group effect (treatment vs. control 
group) -0.07 [-0.4 - 0.3] -0.13 [-0.3 - 0.0] 
Average time effect at Wave 2 -0.11 [-0.3 - 0.0] 0.26*** [0.2 - 0.3] 
Average time effect at Wave 3 0.00 [-0.1 - 0.2] 0.05 [-0.0 - 0.1] 
Intervention effect at Wave 2 -0.13 [-0.4 - 0.2] 0.07 [-0.1 - 0.2] 
Intervention effect at Wave 3 0.23 [-0.1 - 0.5] 0.09 [-0.1 - 0.2] 
Simple effect of moderators 
    Family cohesion reported by adolescent -0.13 [-0.3 - 0.0] 0.32*** [0.2 - 0.5] 
Family cohesion reported by guardian 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.2] 0.02 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Adolescent knows that guardian does not save for 
her/him 0.15 [-0.0 - 0.3] -0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Adolescent knows that guardian saves for her/him 0.01 [-0.3 - 0.3] 0.05 [-0.1 - 0.2] 
Guardian's reported willingness to save 0.03 [-0.0 - 0.1] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Guardian reports saving -0.05 [-0.2 - 0.1] 0.04 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Single-earner family 0.09 [-0.1 - 0.2] 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Number of children in the household -0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] 0.01 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Guardian's age 0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Female guardian -0.14 [-0.3 - 0.0] -0.03 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Type of guardian: grandparent -0.01 [-0.2 - 0.2] -0.03 [-0.2 - 0.1] 
Type of guardian: Other relatives 0.01 [-0.2 - 0.2] -0.02 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Interaction effects 
    Interaction with average group effect 0.08 [-0.4 - 0.6] -0.09 [-0.4 - 0.2] 
Interaction with average time effect at Wave 2 0.29 [-0.1 - 0.6] -0.21* [-0.4 - -0.05] 
Test of interaction effect (a) 
  
F(  1,997296.8)=6.29* 
Interaction with average time effect at Wave 3  0.36* [0.04 - 0.7] -0.17 [-0.4 - 0.0] 
Test of interaction effect (a) F(  1,91032.2)= 4.80* 
  Moderator effect at Wave 2 0.21 [-0.5 - 0.9] 0.03 [-0.3 - 0.4] 
Moderator effect at Wave 3 0.07 [-0.6 - 0.7] -0.02 [-0.4 - 0.3] 
School fixed effects 
    School 1 -0.73*** [-1.1 - -0.3] -0.10 [-0.4 - 0.2] 
School 2 -0.07 [-0.3 - 0.2] -0.22** [-0.4 - -0.1] 
School 3 -0.15 [-0.4 - 0.1] -0.13* [-0.3 - -0.002] 
School 4 0.15 [-0.1 - 0.4] -0.16 [-0.4 - 0.0] 
School 6 0.23 [-0.1 - 0.5] -0.19* [-0.4 - -0.003] 
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School 7 0.02 [-0.3 - 0.4] -0.09 [-0.3 - 0.1] 
School 8 0.17 [-0.2 - 0.5] -0.26* [-0.5 - -0.04] 
School 9 0.18 [-0.1 - 0.5] -0.10 [-0.2 - 0.0] 
Constant (average value for fixed effects) 3.34*** [3.0 - 3.7] 3.59*** [3.4 - 3.8] 
Number of observations 1011 1012 
Number of child ID 344 344 
Wald test (b) 
 F(  30, 
2.5e+06)=2.89*** 
F(  30,861828.3)= 
4.31*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(a) F test for interaction effect being equal to zero. 
(b) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero 
 
 
6.3 (b). Adolescents' financial asset accumulation 
As illustrated in Table 7.1., none of the family characteristics had significant simple effects 
on adolescent’s self-reported saving, while guardian’s gender and guardian’s self-reported saving had 
significant simple effects on adolescent’s self-reported amount saved. In particular, controlling for the 
treatment assignment and for the other moderators, adolescents whose guardians at baseline 
reported having saved money reported saving less than adolescents whose guardians at baseline 
reported not having saved money (B=  -0.36; 95% CI= -0.7, -0.01). Similarly, controlling for the 
treatment assignment and for the other moderators, adolescents who at baseline were cared for by 
female guardians reported saving less than adolescents who at baseline were cared for by male 
guardians (B=-0.5; 95% CI= -0.9, -0.1).  
 








95% CI B coef 95% CI 
Intervention effect (treatment vs. control 
group) 3.43* [1.32 - 8.88] -0.10 [-0.9 - 0.7] 
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Simple effect of moderators 
    Family cohesion reported by adolescent 1.18 [0.84 - 1.66] 0.20 [-0.1 - 0.5] 
Family cohesion reported by guardian 1.48 [0.97 - 2.26] -0.08 [-0.4 - 0.3] 
Adolescent knows that guardian does not save 
for her/him 0.68 [0.44 - 1.04] 0.09 [-0.3 - 0.5] 
Adolescent knows that guardian saves for 
her/him 1.05 [0.63 - 1.74] 0.17 [-0.3 - 0.7] 
Guardian's reported willingness to save 1.05 [0.96 - 1.15] 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Guardian reports saving 1.23 [0.87 - 1.75] -0.36* [-0.7 - -0.01] 
Single-earner family 0.91 [0.63 - 1.30] -0.17 [-0.5 - 0.2] 
Number of children in the household 0.95 [0.87 - 1.04] 0.08 [-0.0 - 0.2] 
Guardian's age 1.00 [0.99 - 1.02] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Female guardian 0.87 [0.57 - 1.33] -0.50** [-0.9 - -0.1] 
Type of guardian: grandparent 1.45 [0.83 - 2.54] 0.08 [-0.5 - 0.6] 
Type of guardian: Other relatives 0.88 [0.60 - 1.28] 0.05 [-0.4 - 0.5] 
School fixed effects 
    School 1 0.58 [0.27 - 1.25] -0.31 [-1.1 - 0.5] 
School 2 0.78 [0.47 - 1.28] 0.33 [-0.1 - 0.8] 
School 3 1.20 [0.70 - 2.07] 0.27 [-0.3 - 0.8] 
School 4 0.81 [0.40 - 1.65] 0.32 [-0.4 - 1.0] 
School 6 1.04 [0.37 - 2.93] -0.43 [-1.3 - 0.4] 
School 7 3.61* [1.30 - 10.03] 0.03 [-0.8 - 0.9] 
School 8 1.76 [0.59 - 5.28] -1.12* [-2.0 - -0.3] 
School 9 0.71 [0.26 - 1.95] -0.37 [-1.3 - 0.5] 
Constant (average value for fixed effects) 0.59 [0.25 - 1.39] 9.81*** [9.1 - 10.6] 
Number of observations 1012 346 
Number of child ID 344 205 
Wald test (a) 
F(  21, 
1.4e+06)=3.33***  F(21, ∞)=1.92** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(a) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero. The individual or 
model residual degrees of freedom is reported to be missing.  This may happen when the 
estimated (average) relative variance increase due to nonresponse is close enough to zero (low 
fraction of missings) such that the degrees of freedom approaches infinity.  In this case, the 
normal distribution is used to compute the significance levels of the reported t tests and the chi-
squared distribution is used to compute the significance level of the F test (Source: Stata (2012). 
Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual) 
 
Family characteristics significantly associated with adolescents' self-reported amount saved (i.e., 
guardian’s self-reported saving and guardian’s gender) were further tested for interaction effects, 
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each moderator tested separately (Table 7.2.). Results show that, despite having significant simple 
effects on adolescents' self-reported amount saved, none of the two moderators had significant 
interaction effect with the intervention. In other words, none of these family characteristics changed 
the effect of the intervention on adolescents' self-reported amount saved. Results also show that, on 
average, adolescents' self-reported amount saved increased from baseline to 24-month follow-up 
(B=0.69; 95% CI=0.4, 1), with the rate of increase being greater for adolescents whose guardians at 
baseline reported having saved money (B=0.78; 95% CI=0.02, 1.5; F=4.01, p<0.05). 
Regressions testing the interaction effects for guardian’s self-reported saving and guardian’s 
gender indicated a statistically significant coefficient for number of children in the household. In 
regression equations with interaction terms, the regression coefficient for the predictor indicates 
relationship between the predictor and the outcome at the moderator value of zero (Frazier et al., 
2004). Consequently, results of the regression testing interaction effects of guardian’s self-reported saving 
imply that for adolescents whose guardian at baseline reported not having money saved, participants 
who lived in the households with greater number of children reported saving more (B=0.09; 95% 
CI=0.01, 0.2). Similarly, results of the regression testing interaction effects of guardian’s gender suggest 
that for adolescents who, at baseline, were cared for by male guardians, participants who lived in 
families with greater number of children reported saving more (B=0.08; 95% CI=0.005, 0.2). Given 
these findings, we tested interaction effects for the number of children in the household (Table 7.2.). 
Results suggest that, controlling for the other moderators, the number of children in the household 
changes the effect of the intervention on adolescent’s self-reported amount saved (B=0.29; 95% CI=0.05, 




















B coef 95% CI B coef 95% CI B coef 95% CI 
Average group effect (treatment vs. control group) -0.39 [-1.3 - 0.5] -0.17 [-1.5 - 1.2] -0.24 [-1.2 - 0.7] 
Average time effect at Wave 2 0.19 [-0.2 - 0.6] 0.22 [-0.3 - 0.8] 0.26 [-0.0 - 0.6] 
Average time effect at Wave 3 0.69*** [0.4 - 1] 1.06** [0.3 - 1.9] 0.93*** [0.6 - 1.2] 
Intervention effect at Wave 2 0.27 [-0.5 - 1.0] -0.10 [-1.2 - 1.0] 0.18 [-0.4 - 0.7] 
Intervention effect at Wave 3 0.53 [-0.1 - 1.2] -0.12 [-1.7 - 1.5] 0.47 [-0.2 - 1.1] 
Simple effect of moderators 
      Family cohesion reported by adolescent 0.10 [-0.3 - 0.5] 0.08 [-0.3 - 0.4] 0.15 [-0.2 - 0.5] 
Family cohesion reported by guardian -0.05 [-0.4 - 0.3] -0.04 [-0.4 - 0.3] -0.05 [-0.4 - 0.3] 
Adolescent knows that guardian does not save for her/him 0.06 [-0.4 - 0.5] 0.09 [-0.3 - 0.5] 0.11 [-0.3 - 0.5] 
Adolescent knows that guardian saves for her/him 0.27 [-0.3 - 0.8] 0.30 [-0.2 - 0.8] 0.30 [-0.2 - 0.8] 
Guardian's reported willingness to save -0.00 [-0.1 - 0.1] 0.00 [-0.1 - 0.1] 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Guardian reports saving -0.92** [-1.5 - -0.3] -0.37* [-0.7 - -0.03] -0.40* [-0.8 - -0.1] 
Single-earner family -0.15 [-0.5 - 0.2] -0.14 [-0.5 - 0.2] -0.18 [-0.5 - 0.2] 
Number of children in the household 0.09* [0.01 - 0.2] 0.08* [0.005 - 0.2] 0.07 [-0.1 - 0.2] 
Guardian's age -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] -0.00 [-0.0 - 0.0] 
Female guardian -0.41* [-0.8 - -0.04] -0.37 [-1.1 - 0.3] -0.47* [-0.9 - -0.1] 
Type of guardian: grandparent 0.16 [-0.4 - 0.7] 0.16 [-0.4 - 0.7] 0.23 [-0.3 - 0.7] 
Type of guardian: Other relatives -0.03 [-0.5 - 0.4] -0.05 [-0.5 - 0.4] 0.03 [-0.4 - 0.4] 
Interaction effects 
      Interaction with average group effect 0.72 [-0.5 - 1.9] -0.21 [-1.5 - 1.1] 0.29* [0.05 - 0.5] 
Test of interaction effect (a) 
    
  F(  1,     .)=5.51* 





Interaction with average time effect at Wave 3 0.78* [0.02 - 1.5] -0.20 [-1.0 - 0.7] 0.01 [-0.1 - 0.1] 
Test of interaction effect (a)    F(  1,     .)=4.01* 
    Moderator effect at Wave 2 -0.51 [-1.8 - 0.7] 0.34 [-1.0 - 1.7] -0.08 [-0.3 - 0.2] 
Moderator effect at Wave 3 -0.68 [-2.2 - 0.9] 0.81 [-0.9 - 2.5] -0.18 [-0.5 - 0.1] 
School fixed effects 
      School 1 -0.37 [-1.2 - 0.5] -0.42 [-1.2 - 0.4] -0.38 [-1.2 - 0.4] 
School 2 0.19 [-0.3 - 0.7] 0.18 [-0.3 - 0.7] 0.24 [-0.2 - 0.7] 
School 3 0.30 [-0.2 - 0.8] 0.31 [-0.2 - 0.9] 0.34 [-0.2 - 0.9] 
School 4 0.20 [-0.5 - 0.9] 0.20 [-0.5 - 0.9] 0.20 [-0.5 - 0.9] 
School 6 -0.38 [-1.2 - 0.5] -0.39 [-1.2 - 0.5] -0.27 [-1.1 - 0.6] 
School 7 0.20 [-0.7 - 1.1] 0.10 [-0.7 - 0.9] 0.23 [-0.7 - 1.1] 
School 8 -0.93* [-1.8 - -0.1] -1.03* [-1.9 - -0.2] -1.01* [-1.9 - -0.1] 
School 9 -0.44 [-1.4 - 0.5] -0.49 [-1.4 - 0.4] -0.41 [-1.4 - 0.5] 
Constant (average value for fixed effects) 9.32*** [8.5 - 10.1] 9.15*** [8.3 - 10.0] 9.14*** [8.4 - 9.9] 
Number of observations 346 346 346 
Number of child ID 205 205 205 
Wald test (b)  F(30, ∞)= 3.6***  F(30, ∞) =  3.2***  F(30, ∞)=3.85*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
  (a) F test for interaction effect being equal to zero. 
  
(b) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero. The individual or model residual 
degrees of freedom is reported to be missing.  This may happen when the estimated (average) relative variance 
increase due to nonresponse is close enough to zero (low fraction of missings) such that the degrees of 
freedom approaches infinity.  In this case, the normal distribution is used to compute the significance levels of 
the reported t tests and the chi-squared distribution is used to compute the significance level of the F test 
(Source: Stata (2012). Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual) 
  
 83 
To further explore the moderating effects mentioned above, we tested whether each of the 
slopes representing the relationship between the intervention and adolescent’s self-reported amount 
saved for different number of children in the household were equal to zero. Specifically, slopes were 
tested for cases with the mean value for the number of children (i.e. 3 children in the household), 
cases below the mean value (i.e., number of children less than 3), and cases above the mean value 
(i.e. number of children more than 3). Results (Table 7.3.) suggest that effect of the intervention on 
adolescent’s self-reported amount saved is significant and positive only for adolescents who live in 
households with less than three children. More specifically, among adolescents who live in 
households with less than three children, adolescents in the treatment group report saving more 
than adolescents in the control group at both 12-month follow-up (B=0.96; 95% CI=0.1, 1.8) and 
24-month follow-up (B=1.76; 95% CI=0.9, 2.6). Both slopes are significantly different from zero. 
 
Table 7.3. Testing different slopes: moderating effect of the 
number of children in the household 
 
  B coef 95% CI χ2(1) 
Number of children in the household = 3 
Average intervention effect -1.41 [-3.3 - 0.4] 2.24 
Intervention effect at Wave 2 -0.68 [-2.0 - 0.6] 1.01 
Intervention effect at Wave 3 -1.61* [-2.8 - -0.4] 6.57** 
Number of children in the household < 3 
Average intervention effect -0.97 [-2.0 - 0.1] 3.37 
Intervention effect at Wave 2 0.96* [0.1 - 1.8] 4.55* 
Intervention effect at Wave 3 1.76*** [0.9 - 2.6] 15.38*** 
Number of children in the household > 3 
Average intervention effect 0.06 [-1.6 - 1.7] 0.00 
Intervention effect at Wave 2 -0.37 [-1.0 - 0.3] 1.24 
Intervention effect at Wave 3 -0.08 [-1.0 - 0.8] 0.03 
*p≤0.05, **p≤0.01, ***p≤0.001. Boldface type indicates statistically significant 
results. 
The single degree of freedom χ2(1) test is for the slope being equal to zero. 
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6.4. Aim 3. Mediator effect of adolescent’s future orientation and family financial 
socialization 
To examine whether an adolescent’s future orientation and family financial socialization 
mediate the effect of the intervention on the adolescent’s financial asset accumulation, the first step 
involved testing the effect of the intervention on potential mediators. More specifically, at this step, 
we examined the effect of the intervention on: (1) adolescents' future orientation, measured through 
the Beck Hopelessness Scale, adolescent’s educational aspirations, and the adolescent’s educational plans (Table 
8.1.), and (2) family financial socialization measured through the guardian’s reported willingness to save, 
guardian’s self-reported saving, and adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him (Table 8.2.). The main 
question of interest at this step was whether a mediator at 12-month follow up differed significantly 
between the treatment and control group as a result of the intervention. 
As shown in Table 8.1., two measures of adolescents' future orientation—Beck Hopelessness 
Scale and adolescent’s educational aspirations—were significantly affected by the intervention. In 
particular, as a result of the intervention, at 12-month follow-up, controlling for demographic 
covariates, adolescents in the treatment group had higher educational aspirations (B=0.41; 95% 
CI=0.04, 0.79) than adolescents in the control group. Also, controlling for demographic covariates, 
compared with adolescents in the control group, adolescents in the treatment group had lower levels 
of hopelessness at both 12-month follow-up (B=-1.08; 95% CI=-1.87, -0.28) and 24-month follow-














B coef. 95% CI B coef. 95% CI Odds Ratio 95% CI 
Average group effect (treatment vs. 
control group) 1.29* [0.16 - 2.41] -0.42 [-0.88 - 0.04] 0.38 [0.08 - 1.89] 
Average time effect at Wave 2 -1.22*** [-1.85 - -0.60] 0.06 [-0.22 - 0.34] 2.11 [0.89 - 5.01] 
Average time effect at Wave 3 -1.63*** [-2.34 - -0.92] 0.10 [-0.18 - 0.39] 2.10 [0.83 - 5.32] 
Intervention effect  at Wave 2 -1.08** [-1.87 - -0.28] 0.41* [0.04 - 0.79] 0.98 [0.30 - 3.22] 
Intervention effect  at Wave 3 -1.40*** [-2.18 - -0.61] 0.22 [-0.14 - 0.57] 2.53 [0.64 - 9.94] 
Demographic covariates 
      Adolescent's age 0.15 [-0.03 - 0.34] -0.10** [-0.18 - -0.03] 0.81 [0.64 - 1.04] 
Adolescent's gender -0.81** [-1.33 - -0.29] 0.53*** [0.34 - 0.72] 0.52 [0.26 - 1.07] 
Single maternal orphan -0.13 [-0.64 - 0.38] 0.17 [-0.02 - 0.36] 1.80 [0.94 - 3.47] 
Single paternal orphan 0.44 [-0.33 - 1.21] 0.20 [-0.04 - 0.44] 1.62 [0.74 - 3.54] 
Guardian's age -0.01 [-0.02 - 0.01] 0.00 [-0.00 - 0.01] 0.99 [0.97 - 1.01] 
Guardian's gender 0.24 [-0.38 - 0.85] 0.23* [0.01 - 0.46] 1.20 [0.59 - 2.42] 
Single-earner family 0.35 [-0.02 - 0.73] -0.09 [-0.25 - 0.07] 0.51 [0.26 - 1.00] 
Number of children in the household 0.01 [-0.10 - 0.12] -0.00 [-0.04 - 0.04] 0.94 [0.82 - 1.09] 
School fixed effects 
      School 1 0.75 [-0.40 - 1.91] -0.54* [-0.96 - -0.11] 0.70 [0.19 - 2.67] 
School 2 -0.09 [-0.91 - 0.74] 0.20 [-0.12 - 0.52] 1.08 [0.29 - 3.98] 
School 3 -0.15 [-1.02 - 0.72] 0.40* [0.07 - 0.72] 1.23 [0.30 - 4.99] 
School 4 -0.25 [-1.49 - 1.00] -0.09 [-0.58 - 0.40] 1.63 [0.38 - 7.02] 
School 6 0.88 [-0.12 - 1.87] -0.31 [-0.74 - 0.12] 0.22* [0.05 - 0.98] 





School 8 1.48* [0.15 - 2.80] -0.23 [-0.71 - 0.26] 0.84 [0.12 - 5.78] 
School 9 0.61 [-0.39 - 1.61] -0.01 [-0.40 - 0.37] 0.28 [0.07 - 1.17] 
Constant (average value for fixed effects) 2.77 [-0.25 - 5.79] 4.67*** [3.49 - 5.84] 1,301.29*** 
[25.66 - 
65,997.84] 
Number of observations 988 967 967 
Number of child ID 344 344 344 
Wald test (a) 
F(  21,478319.6)= 
9.94*** F(  21,76517.2)=4.85***  F(  21,89657.5)=2.10** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 














knowledge of guardian 
saving for her/him 
B coef. 95% CI 
Odds 
Ratio 
95% CI B coef. 95% CI 
Average group effect (treatment vs. control 
group) -0.17 [-0.81 - 0.47] 1.55 [0.52 - 4.67] -0.09 [-0.37 - 0.18] 
Average time effect at Wave 2 -0.81*** [-1.25 - -0.37] 1.20 [0.78 - 1.86] 0.04 [-0.09 - 0.16] 
Average time effect at Wave 3 -0.37 [-0.80 - 0.06] 1.87* [1.12 - 3.12] -0.03 [-0.18 - 0.11] 
Intervention effect  at Wave 2 0.11 [-0.45 - 0.66] 1.77* [1.03 - 3.03] 0.39*** [0.21 - 0.57] 
Intervention effect  at Wave 3 -0.10 [-0.59 - 0.40] 1.80* [1.03 - 3.14] 0.38*** [0.19 - 0.56] 
Demographic covariates 
      Adolescent's age 0.06 [-0.05 - 0.16] 1.03 [0.87 - 1.21] -0.03 [-0.07 - 0.01] 
Adolescent's gender -0.22 [-0.47 - 0.03] 0.92 [0.61 - 1.37] 0.22*** [0.11 - 0.32] 
Single maternal orphan -0.25 [-0.53 - 0.02] 1.33 [0.88 - 2.01] 0.01 [-0.10 - 0.12] 
Single paternal orphan -0.20 [-0.57 - 0.17] 0.81 [0.47 - 1.38] -0.10 [-0.27 - 0.06] 
Guardian's age -0.01* [-0.02 - -0.00] 0.97*** [0.96 - 0.98] -0.00 [-0.00 - 0.00] 
Guardian's gender 0.45** [0.16 - 0.75] 0.25*** [0.15 - 0.40] 0.00 [-0.12 - 0.13] 
Single-earner family 0.09 [-0.15 - 0.33] 0.75* [0.56 - 1.00] -0.00 [-0.10 - 0.09] 
Number of children in the household 0.02 [-0.04 - 0.08] 1.08* [1.00 - 1.17] -0.00 [-0.03 - 0.02] 
School fixed effects 
      School 1 0.53 [-0.18 - 1.23] 0.89 [0.39 - 2.01] -0.05 [-0.28 - 0.19] 
School 2 0.35 [-0.11 - 0.81] 1.37 [0.70 - 2.71] -0.15 [-0.34 - 0.05] 
School 3 -0.05 [-0.48 - 0.37] 2.21* [1.08 - 4.48] 0.15 [-0.02 - 0.32] 
School 4 0.81** [0.28 - 1.33] 1.61 [0.69 - 3.75] 0.04 [-0.22 - 0.31] 
School 6 0.61* [0.02 - 1.20] 1.27 [0.44 - 3.72] -0.14 [-0.41 - 0.13] 
School 7 0.37 [-0.27 - 1.00] 1.49 [0.50 - 4.48] -0.13 [-0.38 - 0.13] 





School 9 0.29 [-0.28 - 0.85] 1.52 [0.53 - 4.37] -0.10 [-0.35 - 0.15] 
Constant (average value for fixed effects) 3.75*** [2.09 - 5.41] 1.84 [0.12 - 29.19] 2.49*** [1.83 - 3.16] 
Number of observations 1006 1006 988 
Number of child ID 344 344 344 
Wald test (a)  F(  21, 3.5e+06)=4.05*** 
F(  21, 5.9e+06) = 
6.06*** 
 F(  21, 1.3e+06) = 
4.96*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 




The intervention also had a significant effect on two measures of family financial 
socialization, namely guardian’s self-reported saving and adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him 
(Table 8.2.). Specifically, controlling for demographic covariates, as a result of intervention, at 12-
month follow-up, a greater proportion of guardian’s in treatment group reported having saved 
money (odds ratio=1.77; 95% CI = 1.03, 3.03) and greater number of adolescents in the treatment 
group reported knowing that the guardian saves for them (B=0.39; 95% CI=0.21, 0.57), compared 
with participants in control group. The effects of the intervention on these measures remained 
significant at Wave 3. In particular, controlling for demographic covariates, at 24-month follow-up, a 
greater proportion of guardian’s in treatment group reported having saved money (odds ratio=1.8; 
95% CI = 1.03, 3.14) and a greater number of adolescents in treatment group reported knowing that 
guardian saves for them (B=0.38; 95% CI=0.19, 0.56), compared with participants in control group. 
Upon obtaining these results, the next step in mediation analyses was to test the effect of a 
change in the mediator, controlling for intervention, on change in the adolescent’s financial asset 
accumulation measured through self-reported saving and self-reported amount saved. These analyses were 
conducted only for those mediators that were significantly affected by the intervention at the 12-
month follow-up, namely, Beck Hopelessness Scale, adolescent’s educational aspirations, guardian’s self-reported 
saving, and adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him. The main question of interest at this step 
was: whether, controlling for the intervention, the change in the mediator from baseline to 12-
month follow-up affects the change in the outcome through study period (that is, from baseline to 
12-month follow-up, and further to 24-month follow-up). Controlling for the effect of the 
intervention as well as for the effect of time at this step is critical, considering the possibility that the 
change in a mediator could potentially be associated with the change in the outcome because they 
both were affected by the intervention and time. 
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Results (Table 9) show that the change in Beck Hopelessness scores, adolescent’s educational 
aspiration scores, guardian’s self-reported saving, and adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him from 
baseline to 12-month follow-up had no significant effect on self-reported saving. Moreover, the effect 
of the intervention on adolescent’s self-reported saving was significant at both Wave 2 (B=2.51; 95% 
CI=1.26, 4.99) and Wave 3 (B=2.27; 95% CI=1.08, 4.79). These findings imply that the effect of the 
intervention on adolescents' self-reported saving in Suubi-Maka study was not mediated either by 
adolescent’s future orientation (measured by Beck Hopelessness Scale and adolescent’s educational 
aspirations) or by family financial socialization (measured by guardian’s self-reported saving, and adolescent’s 
knowledge of guardian saving for her/him). 
In the meantime, however, results in Table 9 also indicate a significant positive association 
between the change in adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him and adolescent’s self-reported 
amount saved. More specifically, increase in the likelihood, from baseline to 12-month follow-up, of 
the adolescent reporting that the guardian saves for her/him was associated with greater amount of 
saving reported by adolescent (B=0.43; 95% CI=0.01, 0.85). Moreover, the earlier established 
significant intervention effect20 on adolescent’s self-reported amount saved at 24-month follow-up was no 
longer significant. This finding suggests that the effect of the intervention on adolescent’s self-reported 
amount saved in Suubi-Maka study is mediated by the adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for 
her/him. It should be noted, however, that the value of the mediation effect obtained through the 
product of coefficients approach was not statistically significant (B=0.12; 95%CI=-0.07, 0.3; p-
value=0.2), with 16% of the total effect being mediated. 
  
                                                 
20 Established earlier in this chapter (see sub-section 6.3. Aim 1. Independent effect of intervention) 
 91 
Table 6. Effect of the change in the mediator on the change in the outcome, 








95% CI B coef. 95% CI 
Beck Hopelessness Scale 
    Effect on outcome 0.97 [0.90 - 1.05] -0.06 [-0.17 - 0.06] 
Effect on rate of change in outcome (Wave 2) 1.04 [0.95 - 1.15] 0.04 [-0.11 - 0.18] 
Effect on rate of change in outcome (Wave 3) 1.04 [0.94 - 1.15] 0.08 [-0.05 - 0.22] 
Adolescent's educational 
aspirations 
    Effect on outcome 0.95 [0.77 - 1.16] 0.00 [-0.24 - 0.24] 
Effect on rate of change in outcome (Wave 2) 1.11 [0.87 - 1.40] 0.13 [-0.15 - 0.40] 
Effect on rate of change in outcome (Wave 3) 1.14 [0.88 - 1.47] 0.13 [-0.16 - 0.42] 
Guardian's self-reported saving 
    Effect on outcome 0.90 [0.52 - 1.56] 0.20 [-0.29 - 0.70] 
Effect on rate of change in outcome (Wave 2) 1.53 [0.74 - 3.15] 0.19 [-0.61 - 0.98] 
Effect on rate of change in outcome (Wave 3) 0.93 [0.45 - 1.93] -0.05 [-0.56 - 0.46] 
Adolescent’s knowledge of 
guardian saving for her/him 
    Effect on outcome 1.20 [0.83 - 1.73] -0.21 [-0.61 - 0.19] 
Effect on rate of change in outcome (Wave 2) 0.91 [0.61 - 1.35] 0.33 [-0.09 - 0.76] 
Effect on rate of change in outcome (Wave 3) 1.08 [0.67 - 1.72] 0.43* [0.01 - 0.85] 
Intervention 
    Average group effect (treatment vs. control 
group) 1.64 [0.58 - 4.64] 0.72 [-0.30 - 1.75] 
Average time effect at Wave 2 1.71* [1.02 - 2.86] 0.71 [-0.18 - 1.59] 
Average time effect at Wave 3 3.58*** [1.95 - 6.57] 1.58 [-0.18 - 3.34] 
Intervention effect  at Wave 2 2.51** [1.26 - 4.99] 0.50 [-0.65 - 1.64] 
Intervention effect  at Wave 3 2.27* [1.08 - 4.79] 0.65 [-0.25 - 1.55] 
Demographic covariates 
    Adolescent's age 0.96 [0.82 - 1.12] 0.16* [0.04 - 0.28] 
Adolescent's gender 0.43*** [0.29 - 0.65] -1.31* [-2.32 - -0.29] 
Single maternal orphan 1.35 [0.87 - 2.09] 0.16 [-0.31 - 0.63] 
Single paternal orphan 1.04 [0.54 - 2.02] -0.03 [-0.55 - 0.49] 
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Guardian's age 1.01 [0.99 - 1.02] 0.01 [-0.01 - 0.02] 
Guardian's gender 0.73 [0.45 - 1.18] -0.48 [-0.97 - 0.02] 
Single-earner family 0.90 [0.64 - 1.24] -0.14 [-0.46 - 0.19] 
Number of children in the household 0.95 [0.86 - 1.05] -0.04 [-0.14 - 0.05] 
School fixed effects 
    School 1 0.51 [0.19 - 1.38] -1.09* [-2.10 - -0.08] 
School 2 0.74 [0.40 - 1.37] 0.03 [-0.51 - 0.58] 
School 3 0.88 [0.46 - 1.68] 0.04 [-0.52 - 0.60] 
School 4 0.93 [0.41 - 2.08] 0.09 [-0.62 - 0.80] 
School 6 0.89 [0.32 - 2.47] -0.16 [-0.81 - 0.49] 
School 7 2.85 [0.99 - 8.24] 1.35 [-0.18 - 2.88] 
School 8 1.50 [0.46 - 4.90] -0.29 [-1.18 - 0.60] 
School 9 0.57 [0.20 - 1.67] -1.24* [-2.35 - -0.14] 
Constant (average value for fixed 
effects) 0.49 [0.04 - 6.19] 4.61** [1.50 - 7.72] 
Mill's lambda 
  
1.24 [-0.47 - 2.96] 
Number of observations 951 298 
Number of child ID 318 178 
Wald test (a) 
F(  33,179507.0)   =      
4.57***  F(34, ∞)    =      5.14*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(b) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero. 
The individual or model residual degrees of freedom is reported to be missing.  This may happen 
when the estimated (average) relative variance increase due to nonresponse is close enough to zero 
(low fraction of missings) such that the degrees of freedom approaches infinity.  In this case, the 
normal distribution is used to compute the significance levels of the reported t tests and the chi-
squared distribution is used to compute the significance level of the F test (Source: Stata (2012). 
Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual) 
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6.5. Additional analyses: administrative/financial institution data on savings  
To verify the self-reported data on savings, bivariate analyses examined correlations between 
the self-reported data and administrative data obtained directly from banks where Child Savings 
Accounts were opened for participants. It is important to note that administrative data on savings 
reflect savings by the end of intervention: (1) whether—by the end of the intervention—families 
opened up Child Savings Accounts and deposited in those accounts, and (2) what was the total 
saving per participant—by the end of the intervention—in Child Saving Accounts. Therefore, 
correlations are tested between the administrative data on savings and the Wave 3 values of self-
reported data, controlling for school fixed effects and accounting for within-subject correlation of 
self-reported savings information due to the repeated measures nature of data. Results of bivariate 
analyses (Table 10) showed a statistically significant correlation between the self-reported saving21 at 
Wave 3 and having active Child Savings Account22 (χ2=4.94, p= 0.02). However, no significant 
correlation was found between the self-reported amount saved at Wave 3 and amount saved in Child Savings 
Accounts (χ2=0.97, p= 0.32). 
  
                                                 
21 To remind, this measure corresponds to the question “whether adolescent has any money saved anywhere”. 
22 Having active Child Savings Account means opening up an account and depositing, at least once, an 
amount greater than zero. 
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Having active Child Savings Account 0.78* [0.09 - 1.47] 
  Amount saved in Child Savings Account 
  
0.14 [-0.13 - 0.41] 
Wald test (a) χ2=4.94*, p= 0.02 χ2=0.97, p= 0.32 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(a) Wald test is for a parameter of interest being equal to zero 
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To examine whether the administrative measures of savings are significantly associated with 
the same set of individual and family characteristics as the self-reported measures of savings, 
regressions controlling for school fixed effects were run on having active Child Savings Account, average 
monthly savings per participants in Child Savings Accounts, and frequency of depositing in Child Savings Accounts 
(Table 11). 
Similar to the self-reported saving, having active Child Savings Account was significantly 
associated with adolescent’s age, adolescent’s hopelessness, and guardian’s self-reported saving. 
More specifically, older adolescents had a greater probability of having active Child Savings 
Accounts (odds ratio=3.4; 95%CI=2.28, 5.09) than younger adolescents. Similarly, adolescents with 
lower level of hopelessness had a greater likelihood of having active Child Savings Accounts opened 
for them (odds ratio=0.77, 95%CI=0.67, 0.89). Furthermore, the proportion of adolescents with 
active Child Savings Accounts was greater among adolescents whose guardians reported having 
saved money (odds ratio=8.11; 95%CI=3.4, 19.33), compared with adolescents whose guardians 
reported not having saved money. Additionally, the ratio of participants with active Child Savings 
Accounts was higher among adolescents who knew their guardians were saving for them (odds 
ratio=4.33, 95%CI=1.56, 12.03), compared with adolescents who did not know whether their 
guardians saved for them. 
Similar to the self-reported amount saved, average amount saved in CSA was significantly 
associated with adolescent’s age, hopelessness, and adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for 
her. In particular, older adolescents (B=1.82; 95% CI=1.3, 2.33) and adolescents with lower level of 
hopelessness (B= -0.38; 95% CI= -0.54, -0.23) saved, on average, larger amounts, compared with 
younger adolescents and adolescents with higher level of hopelessness, respectively. Also, 
adolescents who knew their guardians saved for them had larger average savings in CSA (B=2.4; 
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95% CI=1.39, 3.42), compared with adolescents who did not know whether their guardians saved 
for them.  
In contrast with the self-reported data on savings, none of the administrative measures of 
savings were significantly associated with adolescent’s gender. Also in contrast with the self-reported 
data on savings, guardian’s age and type of guardian were significantly associated with all 
administrative measures of savings. In particular, adolescents cared for by older guardians had 
greater probability of having active CSA (odds ratio=1.04, 95%CI=1, 1.08), saved larger amounts 
(B=0.05, 95% CI=0.01, 0.09), and deposited more frequently (B=0.004; 95% CI=0.001, 0.01) than 
adolescents cared for by younger guardians. Furthermore, adolescents cared for by relatives other 
than parents and grandparents had smaller likelihood of having active CSA (odds ratio=0.23, 
95%CI=0.09, 0.57), smaller average savings in CSA (B= -1.65; 95% CI= -2.5, -0.79), and deposited 
less frequently (B= -0.08; 95% CI= -0.14, -0.02) than adolescents cared for by a living parent. 
The statistically significant coefficient for Mill’s lambda in the model run for average amount 
saved in CSA ( =0.68, 95% CI=0.16, 1.2; p<0.01) indicates selection bias from observing the average 
amount saved in CSA only on the part of the sample that had active Child Savings Accounts. The 







Table 8. Individual and family predictors: administrate data on savings 
 
VARIABLES 
Have active CSA 
(Yes/No) 
Average amount saved 
in CSA 
Frequency of 
depositing in CSA 
Odds Ratio 95% CI B coef 95% CI B coef 95% CI 
Individual Characteristics           
Adolescent's age 3.4*** [2.28 - 5.09] 1.82*** [1.3 - 2.33] 0.06** [0.03 - 0.1] 
Female adolescent 1.10 [0.50 - 2.39] 0.25 [-0.38 - 0.88] 0.02 [-0.02 - 0.06] 
Single paternal orphan 0.92 [0.31 - 2.76] 0.32 [-0.54 - 1.17] 0.01 [-0.03 - 0.06] 
Single maternal orphan 0.95 [0.28 - 3.18] 0.48 [-0.51 - 1.47] 0.04 [-0.03 - 0.10] 
Beck Hopelessness Scale 0.77*** [0.67 - 0.89] -0.38*** [-0.54 - -0.23] -0.01** [-0.02 - -0.005] 
Adolescent's educational aspirations 0.93 [0.68 - 1.27] -0.10 [-0.33 - 0.13] -0.01 [-0.02 - 0.00] 
Planning to start secondary school 1.22 [0.22 - 6.85] 0.77 [-0.36 - 1.90] 0.03 [-0.04 - 0.10] 
Family Characteristics           
Family cohesion reported by adolescent 0.67 [0.32 - 1.4] -0.40 [-1.01 - 0.20] -0.01 [-0.05 - 0.03] 
Family cohesion reported by guardian 0.91 [0.39 - 2.11] 0.33 [-0.35 - 1.01] 0.02 [-0.03 - 0.07] 
Adolescent knows that guardian does not 
save for her/him 0.51 [0.18 - 1.50] -0.73 [-1.59 - 0.14] 0.02 [-0.03 - 0.06] 
Adolescent knows that guardian saves for 
her/him 4.33** [1.56 - 12.03] 2.4*** [1.39 - 3.42] 0.18*** [0.12 - 0.24] 
Guardian's reported willingness to save 1.03 [0.84 - 1.27] -0.09 [-0.26 - 0.09] -0.01* [-0.02 - -0.00] 
Guardian reports saving 8.11*** [3.4 - 19.33] 2.82*** [1.7 - 3.94] 0.16*** [0.09 - 0.24] 
Single-earner family 0.76 [0.35 - 1.67] -0.45 [-1.07 - 0.16] -0.02 [-0.06 - 0.02] 
Number of children in the household 0.97 [0.82 - 1.14] -0.09 [-0.24 - 0.06] -0.00 [-0.01 - 0.01] 
Guardian's age 1.04* [1 - 1.08] 0.05** [0.01 - 0.09] 0.004** [0.001 - 0.01] 
Female guardian 1.54 [0.59 - 4] 0.82 [-0.06 - 1.70] 0.09** [0.04 - 0.15] 
Type of guardian: grandparent 0.38 [0.11 - 1.28] -1.16* [-2.22 - -0.11] -0.10** [-0.17 - -0.04] 





School fixed effects           
School 1 9.17* [1.65 - 50.90] 2.85*** [1.43 - 4.28] 0.12** [0.05 - 0.20] 
School 2 1.56 [0.52 - 4.69] 0.90* [0.11 - 1.68] 0.07** [0.03 - 0.12] 
School 3 3.45* [1.24 - 9.60] 1.58** [0.44 - 2.71] 0.11*** [0.04 - 0.17] 
School 4 1.05 [0.35 - 3.11] -0.29 [-1.32 - 0.75] 0.01 [-0.05 - 0.07] 
Constant 
3.88e-




17.07] -1.20** [-1.95 - -0.45] 
Observations 354 279 279 
Number of adolescent ID 178 177 177 
Mill's lambda 
  
0.68** [0.16 - 1.20] 0.03 [-0.00 - 0.07] 
Wald test (a) F(  23,81898.8)= 3.28*** F(24,  ∞) =36.58*** F(24, ∞)= 8.44*** 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.  Boldface type indicates statistically significant results. 
(b) Wald test is for all model parameters being simultaneously equal to zero. The individual or model residual degrees of freedom is 
reported to be missing.  This may happen when the estimated (average) relative variance increase due to nonresponse is close 
enough to zero (low fraction of missings) such that the degrees of freedom approaches infinity.  In this case, the normal 
distribution is used to compute the significance levels of the reported t tests and the chi-squared distribution is used to compute 
the significance level of the F test (Source: Stata (2012). Multiple-Imputation Reference Manual) 
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This dissertation has aimed to examine savings attitudes and financial asset accumulation of 
poor and vulnerable school-going AIDS-orphaned adolescents involved in a subsidized matched 
child savings program in Uganda and taken care of by a living parent (adolescents who have lost one 
parent) or by an adult guardian within an extended family (for adolescents who have lost both 
parents). More specifically, in this dissertation, I tested the independent intervention effect of 
participation in a subsidized matched savings program—above and beyond the effect of individual and 
family characteristics—on adolescents' saving attitudes and self-reported financial asset 
accumulation. Furthermore, I examined whether the family characteristics (such as family relations, 
family financial socialization, and household demographics) moderated the effect of the intervention 
on adolescents' savings attitudes and self-reported financial asset accumulation. Finally, I looked into 
specific pathways for the effect of intervention, by testing whether adolescents' future orientation 
and the family financial socialization transmit the effect of the intervention on adolescents' saving 
attitudes and self-reported financial asset accumulation. Findings from this dissertation are 
summarized below and followed by a discussion of their implications for policy and future research. 
 
7.1. The intervention effect of participation in subsidized matched savings accounts 
program on adolescents' saving attitudes 
In accordance with the Institutional Theory of Savings, this dissertation has hypothesized 
that participation in subsidized matched savings accounts would improve adolescents' saving 
attitudes. Contrary to the study hypotheses, however, analyses found no effect of participation in 
subsidized matched savings accounts on adolescents' saving attitudes measured through adolescents' 
reported confidence in saving money and adolescents' reported willingness to save. These results might partially 
be accounted for by high rates of both adolescents' reported confidence in saving money and adolescents' 
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reported willingness to save at the baseline. With the high baseline scores on saving attitudes, the possible 
potential change in these attitudes would have been small (i.e. change from the high level of savings 
attitudes to the maximum possible level of savings attitudes); and the small changes are difficult to 
detect with the small sample size. To explain the high baseline scores on savings attitudes, it might 
be due to the “social desirability bias”, which is attributed to self-reported data and refers to the 
tendency on the part of respondents to provide responses perceived as socially appropriate. For 
example, earlier research on saving attitudes of children and adolescents found that attitudes may be 
particularly prone to social desirability bias (Furnham, 1999b). However, high baseline scores on 
savings attitudes among the school-going adolescents participating in the Suubi-Maka study might 
also be attributed to adolescents' strong desire to save and invest in their education. 
Despite finding no intervention effect on adolescents' saving attitudes, this dissertation 
provides some evidence in support of the Family Financial Socialization approach, which argues that 
adolescents' financial attitudes are affected by financial behavior and attitudes of their parents and 
family. More specifically, findings from this dissertation suggest that an adolescent’s willingness to 
save is significantly and positively associated with her/his guardian’s willingness to save. 
Additionally, this dissertation found that adolescents who knew that their guardians were saving for 
them had greater confidence in saving money, compared to adolescents who did not know whether 
their guardians saved for them. These findings support earlier arguments (Brown & Taylor, 2011; 
Gudmunson & Danes, 2011; Webley & Nyhus, 2006) about the importance of parental financial 
attitudes in shaping financial attitudes of children and adolescents, and constitute an important 
contribution to the scarce literature on intergenerational link between the financial attitudes of 
parents/guardians and their children/adolescents. 
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7.2. The intervention effect of participation in subsidized matched savings accounts 
program on adolescents' self-reported financial asset accumulation 
Consistent with the Institutional Theory of Savings, the study found a significant effect of 
participation in subsidized matched savings accounts on adolescents' self-reported financial asset 
accumulation measured through self-reported saving (whether the adolescent saves or not) and self-
reported amount saved. In particular, controlling for individual and family characteristics, adolescents in 
the treatment group, at both 12-month follow-up and 24-month follow-up, were more likely to 
report having money saved, than adolescents in the control group. Similarly, controlling for 
individual and family characteristics, at 24-month follow-up, adolescents in the treatment group 
reported saving 1.5 times as much as adolescents in the control group. 
These findings support the claim that adolescents participating in subsidized matched 
savings accounts have greater likelihood of saving money, compared to adolescents not participating 
in a subsidized matched savings accounts program. Also, these findings are in line with previously 
documented evidence that poor people, even in sub-Saharan African countries with a significant 
proportion of the population living on less than US$2 a day, can and do save when offered 
incentives and institutional mechanisms in the form of matched savings and financial education 
(Ssewamala et al., 2009; Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 2009; Ssewamala, Karimli, et al., 2010). Findings 
from this dissertation contribute to the institutional perspective on savings, arguing that savings are 
not only a function of individual characteristics, but also institutional opportunities. More 
importantly, these findings contribute to the scarce literature that focuses specifically on adolescents' 
financial assets (i.e. assets held in an adolescent’s name) and not parental assets. 
Apart from finding a significant effect of participation in subsidized matched savings 
accounts on adolescents' financial asset accumulation, results of analyses in this dissertation suggest 
that gender is an important factor affecting self-reported financial asset accumulation of adolescents. 
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In particular, female adolescents were less likely to report having saved money, compared to their 
male counterparts. Similarly, female adolescents reported saving smaller amounts than did male 
participants. The significance of gender for savings performance in matched savings accounts has 
not been consistently supported by the evidence. While most studies point to the importance of 
gender in affecting savings performance (Friedline & Elliott, 2011; Han et al., 2009; Huang, 2010; 
Mills et al., 2008), research on savings performance in matched child savings accounts in Uganda 
(Ssewamala & Ismayilova, 2009; Ssewamala, Ismayilova, et al., 2010) found no variation in savings 
by gender. It is important to note that all of these studies used administrative data on savings 
(availed through financial institutions) as opposed to self-reported data on saving performance. 
Moreover, additional analyses conducted in this dissertation using the administrative data from Child 
Savings Accounts found that none of the administrative measures of savings were significantly 
associated with adolescents' gender. Further research on gender dynamics in household financial 
management, and, specifically, in saving, may help better understanding what accounts for the 
significant effect of gender on adolescents' self-reported financial asset accumulation. 
Another finding from this dissertation implies significant school effects on adolescents' 
saving attitudes as well as on adolescents' financial asset accumulation (both self-reported and 
administrative data). In other words, adolescents attending some schools reported greater 
confidence in saving money and higher willingness to save, were more likely to report having saved 
money, and reported saving greater amounts than adolescents attending other schools. These 
findings might potentially be explained by physical proximity of some schools to financial 
institutions. Specifically, some schools were located in district center (as compared to other schools 
located in remote villages). Given this location in the district center, adolescents attending those 
schools had more easy access to financial institutions, they were relatively closer to the bank, and, 
hence, did not incur transport charges for traveling to the bank to save money into their accounts. 
 103 
These findings may also be due to specific school characteristics (e.g. quality of education in a 
particular school and, more specifically, quality of teacher-adolescent interactions in regards to 
money, savings, and future educational plans); and/or due to certain socio-economic characteristics 
of families (e.g. income, wealth, family structure, family demographics) whose children attend a 
particular school. Further research is needed to advance our understanding of what exactly accounts 
for significant school effects on adolescents' saving attitudes and financial asset accumulation. 
 
7.3. Moderating effect of family characteristics 
The study found that the number of children in the household weakens the effect of 
participation in subsidized matched savings accounts on adolescents' self-reported amount saved. In 
particular, results suggest that the intervention had a significant positive effect on adolescents' self-
reported amount saved only for adolescents who lived in households with less than three children23. 
The effect of household size, including the number of children in the household, on family 
members' savings have been studied extensively (Bauer & Auer-Srnka, 2012; Browning & Lusardi, 
1996; Fry, Mihajilo, Russell, & Brooks, 2008; Molina, 2011). There is some evidence that presence of 
young children, particularly in single parent households, may have negative effects on a household’s 
saving behavior. Specifically in the case of AIDS-orphaned adolescents participating in Suubi-Maka 
study, most adolescents are cared for either by a single living parent or by a grandparent. And most 
of these families are single-earner households where guardians are reported to be the only source of 
financial support. Consequently, families caring for orphaned adolescents in the Suubi-Maka study 
face considerable economic constraints. Given the economic hardships, with too many children in 
the household, families will have fewer resources to save for the adolescents. 
                                                 
23 The average (mean) number of children in households participating in Suubi-Maka study was 
equal to 3. 
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Contrary to the dissertation hypotheses, no other family characteristics—including family 
relations (measured by family cohesion reported by adolescent and family cohesion reported by guardian), family 
financial socialization (measured by adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him, guardian’s reported 
willingness to save, and guardians’ self-reported saving), and household demographics (measured by number of 
earners in the household, guardian’s age, guardian’s gender, and type of guardian)—were found to moderate the 
effect of participation in subsidized matched savings accounts either on adolescents' saving attitudes 
or on adolescents' self-reported financial asset accumulation. 
 
7.4. Mediating effect of adolescent’s future orientation and family financial socialization 
In line with the Institutional Theory of Saving and the Family Financial Socialization 
approach, this dissertation has hypothesized that adolescents' future orientation and the family 
financial socialization would transmit the effect of participation in subsidized matched savings 
accounts on adolescents' self-reported financial asset accumulation. 
Several findings obtained through the mediation analyses in this dissertation are noteworthy. 
First, participation in subsidized matched savings accounts was found to have a significant effect, at 
the 12-month follow-up, on family financial socialization (measured through guardian’s self-reported 
saving and adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him) and on adolescents' future orientation 
(measured through Beck Hopelessness Scale and educational aspirations). More specifically, as a result of 
intervention, at the 12-month follow-up, a greater proportion of guardians in the treatment group 
reported having saved money and a greater number of adolescents in the treatment group reported 
knowing that guardians save for them, compared with participants in the control group. Similarly, as 
a result of intervention, at the 12-month follow-up, adolescents in the treatment group had higher 
educational aspirations and lower levels of hopelessness, compared to adolescents in the control 
group. 
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The significant effect of the intervention, at the 12-month follow-up, on the proportion of 
adolescents who knew that their guardians saved for them might have been triggered by the 
improved communication between the guardian and the adolescent, both of whom participated in 
financial education sessions offered by the intervention. Additionally, this change might have been 
prompted by the actual saving resulted from the intervention. In other words, it is possible that, as a 
result of the intervention, the guardian started actually saving for the adolescent, and consequently, 
the adolescent got to know about the guardian saving for her/him. Because of the intervention 
being implemented as a “bundle” of several components (i.e. offering opportunity to open Child 
Savings Accounts, matching monthly deposits, and financial training), we do not know which 
specific component triggered the change. It is, however, important to note that in the Suubi-Maka 
study, by design, no data was collected either on source of saving for the adolescent or on who 
makes the decision to save. Against this backdrop, the significant effect of the intervention on 
guardian’s self-reported saving and adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him may possibly contribute 
to understanding of who saved in families participating in matched child savings accounts. 
The findings from this dissertation showing the significant effect of participation in 
subsidized matched savings accounts on adolescents' future orientation support the earlier evidence 
(Yadama & Sherraden, 1996) that asset-holding increases the chance of having more positive 
attitudes and behaviors, including feelings, expectations, and confidence about the future. Earlier 
research (Elliott, 2009; Elliott, Jung, et al., 2010) has also suggested that adolescents' savings may 
have an even stronger effect than parental savings on adolescents' future orientation (specifically, 
educational expectations and aspirations), because parental savings may be used for other family 
members’ needs, while adolescents' savings focus specifically on adolescents' needs. However, 
further research may be necessary to study the potential variation of the effect of participation in 
subsidized matched savings accounts on the adolescents' future orientation between participants 
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who, after being offered the opportunity to open Child Savings Accounts, took this opportunity and 
saved, and those participants who, although being offered the opportunity, did not open an account, 
or opened an account but never deposited. 
Despite the significant effect of the intervention on adolescents' future orientation, 
measured through Beck Hopelessness Scale and educational aspirations, at the 12-month follow-up, no 
mediator effect was found for adolescent’s future orientation. In other words, contrary to the 
dissertation hypotheses, adolescent’s future orientation, measured through Beck Hopelessness Scale and 
educational aspirations, although changed from baseline to 12-month follow-up as a result of 
intervention, did not, however, transmit the effect of the intervention onto adolescent’s’ self-
reported financial asset accumulation at the 24-month follow-up. 
Similarly, no mediator effect was found for family financial socialization measured through 
guardian’s self-reported saving. That is contrary to the dissertation hypotheses, guardian’s self-reported saving, 
although changed from baseline to 12-month follow-up as a result of intervention, did not, however, 
transmit the effect of intervention on adolescent’s self-reported financial asset accumulation at the 
24-month follow-up. 
This dissertation, however, did find a mediator effect for family financial socialization 
measured through adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him. More specifically, as a result of 
participation in subsidized matched savings accounts, at a 12-month follow-up, a greater number of 
adolescents in the treatment group reported knowing that guardians save for them, compared with 
participants in the control group; and this change in an adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving 





This dissertation contributes to the nascent body of work on saving behavior and attitudes 
of adolescents in subsidized matched child savings accounts programs in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Subsidized matched child savings programs, specifically in developing countries, are rare initiatives 
that connect poor adolescents and their families to financial institutions. Although some evidence 
exists pointing to the fact that poor families in sub-Saharan Africa save if provided with institutional 
opportunities, none of the studies tested the intervention effect of participation in a subsidized matched 
savings accounts program on the saving attitudes and behaviors of AIDS-orphaned adolescents. 
This dissertation, using data from a longitudinal cluster-randomized controlled trial intervention, is, 
therefore, an important contribution to building robust evidence-based policies that facilitate asset 
accumulation for adolescents in sub-Saharan Africa. 
This study also makes an important contribution to the emerging body of work that focuses 
specifically on adolescents' financial asset accumulation, distinct from parental assets. As mentioned 
earlier in this dissertation, very few studies specifically address asset accumulation by the adolescents 
themselves. Yet, adolescents' savings may have an effect on their future orientation and educational 
aspirations that is different from the effect parental assets have on these same factors (Elliott, 2009; 
Elliott, Jung, et al., 2010; Elliott, Kim, et al., 2010). Moreover, mounting evidence has indicated that 
people who save in adolescence are more likely to save in adulthood (Ashby et al., 2011; Friedline et 
al., 2011). Therefore, findings from this dissertation may potentially have long-term implications for 
designing asset-building initiatives that address inter-generational mobility out of poverty. 
The importance of family financial socialization found in this dissertation underscores the 
need for closer attention to families (both nuclear and extended) when building assets for 
adolescents in poor-resource settings. Findings from this dissertation suggest that family can 
potentially be an important component when building subsidized matched savings accounts for 
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adolescents. From the program-development perspective, these findings may suggest the importance 
of actively involving parents and guardians in programs that aim to establish matched child savings 
accounts. More specifically, given the significant association between the family characteristics and 
adolescents’ saving attitudes found in this dissertation, the family financial socialization framework 
might possibly be a better approach for programs and policies that aim at changing adolescents’ 
saving attitudes. Furthermore, given that guardians’ saving for adolescents potentially mediates the 
effect of participation in a subsidized matched child savings accounts program on the adolescent’s 
self-reported amount saved, the financial education and training components of these programs may 
need to focus more on caregivers (parents and guardians) than on adolescents. In conclusion, the 
dissertation findings suggest the utility of asset-building initiatives specifically targeting adolescents 
that integrate not only institutional constructs but also family characteristics. 
From the research perspective, more detailed information may be necessary to understand 
family dynamics related to their internal financial management. For example, future studies may be 
strengthened significantly by examining the specific processes of family financial socialization to 
form a better understanding of the intergenerational transfer of financial attitudes and behavior. It is 
also important to understand who within the family decides to save for an adolescent and how this 
decision is communicated. Furthermore, linking back to the poverty problem, it is important to 
further examine how much saving is “enough” to help adolescents and their families escape poverty. 
Asset-building policies may need to develop context-specific and country-specific recommendations 
matching caps and matching rates. 
This dissertation has improved upon the methods of the existing research on adolescents' 
saving attitudes and self-reported financial asset accumulation by using a longitudinal and cluster-
randomized experimental design, as well as by incorporating information collected not only from 
adolescents but also from their parents/guardians. That being said, however, future research may be 
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strengthened significantly by not only using the self-reported data on savings, but also including 
administrative savings data, for both the treatment and the control groups in the intervention (this 
point is discussed in detail in Chapter 8: Limitations. Furthermore, to extend the generalizability of 
the study findings, future research may consider involving adolescents not living in families (e.g. 
street children) as well as adolescents living in child-headed families. 
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CHAPTER 8: LIMITATIONS 
The study has several limitations. Using the self-reported data on savings is, perhaps, the 
biggest limitation. In fact, self-reports are being used extensively in surveys measuring household 
income, expenditure, and consumption. Moreover, the self-reported data is being used to measure 
savings specifically by children and adolescents (Elliott, 2009; Elliott, Choi, et al., 2011; Elliott, Kim, 
et al., 2010). Nevertheless, the sensitivity of self-reports to specific survey tools has been 
acknowledged to be a potential issue (Beegle, De Weerdt, Friedman, & Gibson, 2012; Gibson, 
2006). Furthermore, with self-reports there is a likelihood of both overestimation and 
underestimation of actual savings by an individual, which may lead to inaccuracies in estimating the 
effect size. 
The Suubi-Maka study, by design, obtained the verifiable savings data directly from the 
financial institution. This verifiable data, however, was only available for participants in the 
treatment condition, that is, participants with the Child Savings Accounts whose bank statements 
were received by the study every month. However, to take advantage of the randomized 
experimental design of the Suubi-Maka study, I used the self-reported items administered in both 
the treatment and control condition at all three waves, including the baseline. These self-reported 
items—self-reported saving (“Do you currently have any money saved anywhere?”), and self-reported 
amount of money saved (“How much money do you currently have saved?”)—reflect unverifiable 
savings data.  
To address the limitation and to verify self-reported data on savings, I tested the correlation 
between the self-reported data and administrative data. Results showed a significant correlation 
between self-reported saving and having active Child Savings Account. No correlation was found between 
self-reported amount saved and amount saved in Child Savings Accounts. Additionally, I examined whether the 
administrative measures of savings were significantly associated with the same set of individual and 
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family characteristics as the self-reported measures of savings. Results showed that similar to the 
self-reported items, administrative measures of savings, namely, having active Child Savings Account and 
average amount saved in CSA, were significantly associated with the adolescent’s age, adolescent’s 
hopelessness, adolescent’s knowledge of guardian saving for her/him, and guardian’s self-reported 
saving. However, in contrast with the self-reported data on savings, none of the administrative 
measures of savings were significantly associated with adolescent’s gender. Also in contrast with the 
self-reported data on savings, guardian’s age and type of guardian were significantly associated with 
all administrative measures of savings. 
For accuracy in reporting, future studies could devise a means of having all study 
participants—both control and treatment—provide savings statements from financial institutions 
for verification purposes. This process, however, may face some challenges, specifically in the 
context of poor unbanked households in developing countries. For example, in Uganda where only 
20% of population have bank accounts (Demirguc-Kunt, Beck, & Honohan, 2008), verifiable data 
on savings in the control group may not be available merely because participants in the control 
group are not likely to have bank accounts. 
Another limitation of the study is the lack of information on household consumption and 
expenditure patterns, which impedes close examination of households’ financial management 
mechanisms. For example, when adolescents save in the project, we do not know who is making the 
decision to save: adolescents themselves or families? In the Suubi-Maka study, the dataset does not 
contain information on the source of saving for the adolescent: from where do adolescents take 
money? It is important to understand who, within the family, makes decisions on savings; how these 
decisions are communicated among the family members; and how the structure of power within the 
household, social constructions of gender behavior and orphanhood status affect the family’s 
decision to save for an adolescent, especially for an orphan adolescent who is taken care of by a 
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family. It would also be informative to examine how saving in Child Saving Accounts affects 
families’ consumption patterns, particularly given significant budget constrains experienced by poor 
families in our sample. 
Finally, the Suubi-Maka study focuses specifically on school-going adolescents who are taken 
care of by a living parent or by an adult caregiver within the extended family. The study does not 
cover orphans living in child-headed households or orphans living in the streets. Therefore, 
inferences cannot be made about saving behavior and attitudes towards saving for all orphaned 
adolescents. For example, the study cannot make inferences about orphans’ saving behavior and 
attitudes in the absence of family structures (for example, street orphans) or in the absence of an 
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value ICC 95% CI 
Adolescent's savings attitudes   
 
  
 Reported willingness to save 0.52 0.47 0.05 [0; 0.19] 
Reported confidence in saving 
money 0.27 0.60 0.03  [0; 0.15] 
Adolescent's financial asset 
accumulation   
 
  
 Self-reported saving 1.58 0.21 0.15 [0.11; 0.15] 
Self-reported amount saved (LOG) 0.00 1.00 0.00 [0; 0] 
Null hypothesis: there is no significant difference between the model nested in 
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other for help before asking non-








2. Do your family members like to 

















4. Are you available when others in the 
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6. We do things together as a family.      
7. Do your parent(s) take time to listen 






   
8. If you have a problem, how often do 





   
9. Can you count on your current 
parent(s)/guardian(s) to help you out, 
if you have some kind of problem? 
     
10. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
say that you shouldn't argue with 
adults? 
     
11. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
keep pushing you to do your best in 
whatever you do? 
     
12. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
say that you should give in on 
arguments rather than make people 
angry? 
     
13. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
keep pushing you to think 
independently? 
     
14. When you get a poor grade in school, 
do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
punish you? 
     
15. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
show interest in your schoolwork? 



















16. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
tell you that their ideas are correct and 
that you should not question them? 
     
17. When your current 
parent(s)/guardian(s) want you to do 
something, do they explain why? 
     
18. Whenever you argue with your 
current parent(s)/guardian(s), do they 
say things like, "You'll know better 
when you grow up"? 
     
19. When you get poor marks in school, 
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encourage you to try harder? 
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let you make your own plans for 
things you want to do? 
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know who your friends are? 
     
22. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
act cold and unfriendly if you do 
something they don't like? 
     
23. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
spend time just talking with you? 
     
24. When you get poor marks in school, 
do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
make you feel guilty? 
     
25. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
do things for fun together? 
     
26. Do your current parent(s)/guardian(s) 
stop you from doing things with them 
when you do something they don't 
like? 
     
 
 
